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ABSTRACT 
This mixed method research uses a series of case studies and an agent based simulation to in-
vestigate how firms do and should acquire information to manage risks inherent in supplier pro-
cesses. Managing this risk born from supplier non-compliance is important because it can not 
only threaten a firm’s reputation and bottom line, but it can also affect various stakeholders. Cur-
rent literature on supplier risk management recommends that firms acquire comprehensive in-
formation on potential triggers of supplier non-compliance to mitigate this risk in an effective 
manner. Nevertheless, the literature fails to acknowledge that firms often choose not to obtain 
such information. In fact, the results from multiple case studies indicate that firms seek to ac-
quire comprehensive information on potential triggers of supplier non-compliance only when 
they do not see other alternatives to address the risks of supplier non-compliance. The sampled 
firms reduce their need for comprehensive information on supplier processes because of close 
relational ties with suppliers or the presence of powerful external stakeholders, such as regulato-
ry agencies, monitoring supplier processes. The agent-based simulation then reveals conditions 
under which firms should rely on the relational ties and powerful stakeholders to reduce the sup-
plier risks they face.   
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
A firm’s operational, environmental, and social performance to a great extent depends on the 
ability of its suppliers to comply with order requirements (Krause et al. 2009; Lambert, 2008). 
Yet, firms often lack information to ensure that their suppliers remain compliant. Identifying 
possible supplier non-compliance is important because it can threaten the firm’s reputation, bot-
tom line and survival, while also affecting its customers and other stakeholders.  
To ensure supplier compliance, the literature recommends creating transparent supply chains 
(e.g., Awaysheh and Klassen, 2010; Lamming et al., 2001; New, 2010; Skilton and Robinson, 
2009; Tse and Tan, 2012). In transparent supply chains, firms have comprehensive information 
on supplier processes. The firms can thus easily ensure that suppliers follow product quality re-
quirements, do not cause supply delays or other operational disruptions, and do not engage in 
socially irresponsible practices (Marucheck et al., 2011; New, 2010).  
While the literature clearly articulates that firms should create transparent supply chains, it is 
yet to explain how to do so. In particular, it remains unclear what barriers firms face when they 
attempt to acquire comprehensive information on supplier processes and how the firms overcome 
these barriers. Without such knowledge, it is difficult to determine how firms should acquire 
comprehensive information on supplier processes. To address this gap in the literature, I use a 
combination of multiple case studies and an agent-based simulation to explore how firms do and 
should acquire comprehensive information on supplier processes to ensure compliance. 
Using a series of case studies, I first investigate how firms acquire the information required to 
ensure supplier compliance. The collected case studies offer a number of empirical contribu-
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tions. First, they clarify that firms approach the issue of transparent supply chains from the risk 
management perspective. Only firms that face significant risk of supplier non-compliance strive 
to acquire comprehensive information on supplier processes to mitigate this risk, i.e., to take ac-
tions aimed at reducing the likelihood of supplier non-compliance. Furthermore, the cases show 
that firms that seek to acquire comprehensive information on supplier processes focus their ef-
forts on the first-tier suppliers, and not the entire supply chain. Finally, the case studies reveal 
that many firms choose not to acquire comprehensive information on supplier processes. Instead, 
they depend either on close relational ties with their suppliers or on powerful external stakehold-
ers, such as regulatory agencies, to manage the risk of supplier non-compliance.  
I use these unexpected empirical findings as the foundation for an agent-based simulation that 
explores how a firm’s decisions influence the likelihood of supplier non-compliance. Manipulat-
ing a firm’s decision-making in a simulation helps compare the empirically observed behavior 
with the behavior recommended by the literature. Hence, the simulation addresses the second 
research question: What decisions should firms make to reduce the likelihood of supplier non-
compliance?  
The prescriptive results of the agent-based simulation complement the descriptive results of 
the case studies. Combined, the case studies and the agent-based simulation offer a number of 
contributions to the literature on supplier risk management. First, while the literature recom-
mends risk mitigation for all firms (e.g., Sodhi et al., 2012), this research clarifies that only firms 
with a high capability to assess and monitor suppliers’ processes should favor risk mitigation. 
Firms that lack this capability should instead seek to avoid the risk of supplier non-compliance. 
These firms are better off not acquiring comprehensive information on supplier processes to en-
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gage in risk mitigation, because they are unable to use this information to substantially reduce 
the likelihood of supplier non-compliance.  
This research reveals two paths firms may take to avoid, rather than mitigate, the risk of sup-
plier non-compliance that have been neglected by the supplier risk management literature. One 
path to avoid the risk of supplier non-compliance is to form close relationships with suppliers. 
Firms relying on close relational ties with their suppliers do not collect information on supplier 
processes because they believe the relationships provide strong incentives for suppliers to com-
ply, allowing them to avoid the risk. Despite some authors warning against close, trust-based re-
lationships in supplier risk management (e.g., Harland et al. 2003), this research indicates that 
this approach may be suitable, especially for firms that lack the capability to fully assess supplier 
processes. Another path to avoid the risk of supplier non-compliance exists in industries where a 
powerful external stakeholder is involved in controlling the suppliers. A number of authors have 
warned that firms can be in a vulnerable position when they know less about their supplier risks 
than their stakeholders do (e.g., New, 2010; Scherer et al., 2013). Yet, this research shows that 
firms benefit from having an external stakeholder that monitors supplier processes and incentiv-
izes their suppliers to remain compliant. Finally, this research also shows that some firms choose 
to tolerate supplier risks, an approach largely omitted in the supplier risk management literature 
(Hajmohammad and Vachon, 2016). These more tolerant firms manage non-compliances only if 
they materialize. In doing so, they contradict the literature that focuses on prevention and risk 
minimization. 
This research offers important managerial implications. First, it shows that firms should make 
a decision to mitigate the risk of supplier non-compliance not only by considering the source of 
the risks, the processes of their suppliers, but also by taking into account whether they possess a 
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high capability to assess and monitor supplier processes. Second, this research shows that firms 
that rely on close relationships to avoid the risk of non-compliance face a threat of overestimat-
ing a supplier’s ability to comply. It then reveals that a small supply base that is selected using 
strict criteria and faces termination for non-compliance, diminishes this threat. Third, this re-
search provides a recommendation for firms that operate in highly regulated industries and have 
an external stakeholder involved in controlling their suppliers. These firms should view such a 
stakeholder involvement as a beneficial arrangement. Whenever these firms believe that the 
stakeholder lacks capability to ensure supplier compliance, they should complement the stake-
holder's efforts by having stricter selection standards and sourcing from fewer suppliers. Finally, 
this research clarifies the value of monitoring supplier processes. Supplier monitoring is required 
to ensure low likelihood of non-compliance in large supply bases. In many industries with com-
plex production, firms have to source from a large number of suppliers. This research shows that 
these firms can assure supplier compliance only if they, or an involved stakeholder, oversee sup-
plier processes.  
The cases allowed for a detailed exploration of what firms did. The simulation offered a de-
tailed exploration of what they should do. Combined they offer meaningful new insight into sup-
plier risk management and help to elaborate on the conditions when acquiring comprehensive 
information on supplier processes is appropriate.   
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
The existing literature recognizes that firms are vulnerable to supplier non-compliance (e.g., 
Marucheck et al., 2011; Sodhi et al., 2012). This risk can not only damage the firms’ reputation 
and bottom line but also threatens the society at large (Madsen, 2009; New, 2010). To address 
this risk, the literature recommends creating transparent supply chains (e.g., Lamming et al. 
2001; Skilton and Robinson, 2009; Tse and Tan, 2011; New, 2010; Awaysheh and Klassen, 
2011). In transparent supply chains, firms have comprehensive information on supplier processes 
and thus can mitigate the risk of supplier non-compliance in an effective manner (Roth et al. 
2008; Williams et al., 2013).   
In addition, the systematic literature review on supply chain transparency conducted prior to 
the collection of case data (Appendix A) revealed that two theoretical themes, governance mech-
anism and the complexity of a firm’s supply chain, are related to the process of creating trans-
parent supply chains. Specifically, the reliance on relational governance makes it more likely that 
firms will gain access to comprehensive information on supplier processes (e.g., Jiang, 2009; 
Peck, 2005). The complexity of supply chains can substantially inhibit firms’ efforts to collect 
this information (e.g., Mena et al., 2013; Speier et al., 2011).  
The value of supply chain transparency 
The systematic review of supply chain transparency literature (Appendix A) reveals a large 
number of studies that refer to the notion of supply chain transparency. Yet, only a few of them 
offer a formal definition (Table 1). Some authors note that supply chain transparency is associat-
ed with a firm’s ability to acquire information on supplier processes (e.g., Lamming et al. 2001; 
Roth et al. 2008). Others argue that the supply chain transparency is determined by the extent a 
firm shares this information with its external stakeholders (e.g., Awaysheh and Klassen, 2010; 
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Carter and Easton, 2011; Skilton and Robinson, 2009). I employ the former approach and define 
supply chain transparency as the extent to which a firm is able to acquire comprehensive infor-
mation on supplier processes. I chose the perspective of the focal firm, and not on of its stake-
holders, because the focus of this research is on the firm’s own efforts to acquire information on 
supplier processes.  
Citation Definition 
Lamming et al. (2001) “the two-way exchange of information and knowledge between customer and supplier” (p. 4) 
Skilton and Robinson (2009)  
“the extent to which information about sources, processes and relationships is 
readily accessible to counterparties in an exchange, and to outside observers” (p. 
41) 
Roth et al. (2008)  “the lack of secrecy, or the systematic provision of product and processing infor-mation under informal and formal agreements” (p. 23) 
Angeles and Nath (2001)  “[the] ability to share and exchange information needed to complete transaction sets and to fulfill requirements of shared business applications” (p.112) 
Inkpen and Crossan (1995)  “the openness and willingness of the partner firm to share its embedded knowledge” (p. 613) 
Hamel (1991) “openness of the firm to its partner” (p. 85) 
Awaysheh and Klassen (2010) “the extent to which information is readily available to end-users and other firms in the supply chain” (p. 1249) 
Carter and Easton (2011) 
“proactively engaging and communicating with key stakeholders and having 
traceability and visibility into upstream and downstream supply chain operations” 
(p. 49) 
Table 1. Definitions of supply chain transparency 
Despite the disagreements in definitions, the literature agrees that firms benefit from supply 
chain transparency, with many authors arguing that firms should strive to create transparent sup-
ply chains (Blackhurst et al., 2011; Christopher and Lee, 2004; Co and Barro, 2009; Hora et al., 
2011; Kleindorfer and Saad, 2005; Lamberti and Lettieri, 2009; Lamming et al., 2001; 
Marucheck et al., 2011; New, 2010; Neiger et al., 2009; Vlajic et al., 2012; Tse and Tan, 2012). 
To create transparent supply chains, firms are required to have an objective understanding of 
supplier processes and therefore need to ensure that the suppliers do not conceal any issues pre-
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sent in their operations (Roth et al. 2008; Williams et al., 2013). Roth et al. (2008) explain that in 
transparent supply chains there exists mutual openness and “a lack of secrecy” (p. 23) between 
the firms with their suppliers. Overall, supply chain transparency is necessary to identify “disrup-
tions from normal activities” (Kleindorfer and Saad, 2005: 53) that have potential for great nega-
tive impact on a firm and its stakeholders. These disruptions from normal activities are supplier 
risks. They include product safety violations and the use of socially irresponsible practices 
(Blackhurst et al., 2011; Kleindorfer and Saad, 2005; Lamberti and Lettieri, 2009). Supply chain 
transparency then is required to identify and manage potential triggers of supplier risks. 
The role of information in supplier risk management 
Supplier risks: Definition and drivers 
Supplier risks vary from labor strikes in supplier facilities to supply delays to procurement of 
counterfeit components. This research focuses on process-based risks and hence defines supplier 
risk as a supplier non-compliance that can disrupt a firm’s operational processes and, as a result, 
can harm its reputation (Harland et al., 2003; Jüttner et al., 2003; Jüttner, 2005; Marucheck et al., 
2011; Narasimhan and Talluri, 2009). The literature distinguishes two characteristics of supplier 
risks. The first is their likelihood, which is associated with the presence of risk triggers, i.e. devi-
ations from a firm’s requirements, in supplier processes (Ellis et al., 2011; Harland et al., 2003). 
The likelihood of supplier non-compliance is high when the triggers are present in the supplier’s 
daily operations. In contrast, this likelihood is low when the triggers appear only in extraordinary 
circumstances. The second characteristic of supplier risks is their impact; what a firm will face if 
these risks materialize (Hora and Klassen, 2013; Lewis, 2003). The impact of supplier non-
compliance is high when the non-compliance has the potential to create long-term damage to the 
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firm, or even put it out of business. The impact is low when supplier non-compliance causes 
short-term disruptions and losses, but does not threaten the firm’s survival (Harland et al., 2003). 
In some buyer-supplier relationships, a supplier that fails to comply with a firm’s require-
ments will share the negative impact of its non-compliance with the firm (Manuj and Mentzer, 
2008; Kleindorfer and Saad 2005). Jüttner (2005) empirically shows that firms prefer sourcing 
from such suppliers. Manuj and Mentzer (2008) point out that firms usually benefit from situa-
tions when they share risk impact with their suppliers. However, some suppliers may remain un-
affected by their non-compliances and may knowingly cause a non-compliance, threatening a 
buying firm’s viability (Gümüs et al., 2012). 
Drivers to ensure supplier compliance 
The supplier risk management literature highlights both internal and external driving forces 
that push firms to create transparent supply chains to ensure supplier compliance. The internal 
driving force is a firm’s own vulnerability to supplier risks. A firm’s performance – operational, 
environmental, and social – depends on its suppliers (Lambert, 2008). A supplier may threaten a 
firm's performance if it uses poor practices, inferior raw materials or improper packaging 
(Marucheck et al., 2011). Marucheck et al. (2011) claims that manufacturing and pharmaceutical 
firms are often forced to oversee how their suppliers design and produce components, because 
suppliers can significantly undermine product security and safety. Leaders in sustainability trace 
the origins of their products to ensure that their suppliers take steps to limit the impact on the en-
vironment and society (Pagell and Wu, 2009). Thus, only in transparent supply chains firms can 
ensure that the suppliers operate in a way that does not inhibit their performance (Christopher 
and Peck, 2004; Marucheck et al., 2011; Mena et al., 2013).  
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The external force driving firms to create transparent supply chains to ensure supplier compli-
ance is stakeholder pressure. Stakeholders can pressure a firm when supplier non-compliance not 
only has a negative impact on the firm, but also on society at large (Awaysheh and Klassen, 
2010; Christmann, 2004; Doorey, 2011; Madsen, 2009; New, 2010). This can occur when sup-
pliers compromise product safety or pollute surrounding communities. Various stakeholders use 
different means to pressure firms. Government agencies rely on legislation; for instance, E.U. 
legislation requires firms in many industries to ensure supplier compliance with product safety 
standards and trace the origins of product components (Alfaro and Rábade, 2009; Viaene and 
Verbeke, 1998; Wagner and Bode, 2006). Customers can express their demands through product 
preference. Park-Poaps and Rees (2010) empirically demonstrate that American consumers pre-
fer products with labeling that guarantees good working conditions in supplier facilities. Industry 
initiatives also often motivate firms to ensure their suppliers comply with codes of conduct 
(Egels-Zanden, 2014).  
Powerful stakeholders, such as NGOs and government agencies, may seek to gain access to 
supplier information and discover potential risk triggers in firms’ supply bases (Awaysheh and 
Klassen, 2010; Scherer et al., 2013). Many large firms react to such stakeholder actions by trans-
ferring questionable practices to offshore divisions (Surroca et al., 2013). Christmann (2004) 
empirically shows that firms cease such activities if their stakeholders are likely to cooperate 
with each other to investigate the firms’ operations. Many authors argue that firms should instead 
proactively identify and manage the risks associated with their suppliers before their stakeholders 
become aware of them (e.g., Awaysheh and Klassen, 2010; Madsen, 2009; New, 2010). In par-
ticular, New (2010) notes that firms should address potential supplier risks by helping their sup-
pliers improve working conditions and limit pollution levels. 
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In addition, firms should proactively address stakeholder pressure by engaging with various 
stakeholder groups (e.g., Parmigiani et al., 2011; Carter and Rogers, 2008; Wu and Pagell, 2011; 
Alvarez et al., 2010) to ultimately ‘convert’ stakeholder pressure into a source of knowledge 
(Roome and Wijen, 2006; Griesse, 2007). External stakeholders may help identify what specific 
information a firm should acquire to ensure supplier compliance. The stakeholders may also clar-
ify the extent to which a firm is responsible for its supply chain (Carter and Rogers, 2008). As 
Sloan and Oliver (2013) argue, ultimately a firm should change its relationship with external 
stakeholders from power-based – when the stakeholders push the firm to address their demands – 
to trust-based. The authors, however, note that most firms do not share values with their stake-
holders and consequently find it difficult to establish trust-based relationships with the stake-
holders.  
Finally, firms often face both internal and external driving forces to ensure supplier compli-
ance. However, one driving force is likely to dominate over the other. For instance, a manufac-
turer of industrial machinery may be concerned about eliminating potential threats to product 
quality in its supply chain because the dependability of its products requires having suppliers that 
follow strict order requirements (the internal driver). In contrast, a chain of coffee shops may 
strive to ensure good working conditions at coffee farms, from which it procures its coffee beans, 
to demonstrate the supply chain-wide commitment to the goals of sustainability (the external 
driver). 
Why effective risk management requires information on supplier processes 
Agency theory has been central to creating a better understanding of how firms should man-
age supplier risks (e.g., Hajmohammad and Vachon, 2016; Whipple and Roh, 2010; Zsidisin and 
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Ellram, 2003). Agency theory focuses on a relationship between a principal (e.g. a firm) and an 
agent (e.g. a firm’s supplier). When the principal assigns a task to the agent, it faces the threat of 
the agent failing to complete the task successfully. This threat exists because the agent’s goals 
may not align with the principal’s, the principal did not observe how the agent completed the 
task, or the principal may have misjudged the agent’s ability to complete the task successfully 
(Anderson and Oliver, 1987; Eisenhardt, 1989A; Fayezi et al., 2012).  
The principal can ensure successful task completion by controlling inputs, behavior, or out-
puts. Input control focuses on ensuring that the agent has the required skills and incentives prior 
to assigning the task (Hajmohammad and Vachon, 2016; Ouchi, 1979). That is, input control is 
oriented towards ensuring goal alignment between the agent and the principal (Fayezi et al., 
2012; Ketchen and Hult, 2007). Behavioral control is associated with verifying whether agent 
behavior satisfies the requirements the principal established for successful task completion (Ei-
senhardt, 1989A; Zsidisin and Ellram, 2003). Finally, output control focuses on assessing agent 
performance after task completion (Eisenhardt, 1989A).  
The supplier risk management literature notes that under certain circumstances, firms can rely 
on input control to avoid supplier risks (Hajmohammad and Vachon, 2016). Specifically, firms 
can avoid risks by sourcing from suppliers operating in environments where causing a non-
compliance is unacceptable (Jüttner et al., 2003). For example, a firm can avoid the risk of slave 
labor if it does not source from manufacturers with facilities located in countries known for weak 
labor laws, poor work and safety practices, and frequent violations of human rights. Neverthe-
less, the literature assumes that the instances when a firm can ensure that it has avoided all sup-
plier risks are rare. 
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Agency theory recommends behavioral control when a principal faces high uncertainty asso-
ciated with how an agent completes the task (Zsidisin and Ellram, 2003). This suggestion is 
based on assumption that the principal is “flawless” and that it has the capability to accurately 
assess the agent’s behavior: a “questionable” assumption (Fayezi et al., 2012: 565) that also un-
derpins the supplier risk management literature on risk mitigation via behavioral control.   
The supplier risk management literature presupposes the existence of the uncertainty associat-
ed with supplier processes and for that reason focuses predominantly on using behavioral con-
trols to mitigate supplier risks. Risk mitigation refers to a firm’s actions aimed at reducing the 
likelihood of supplier non-compliance (Harland et al., 2003; Jüttner et al., 2003; Kleindorfer and 
Saad, 2005). The majority of articles to date view risk mitigation as the essential component of 
supplier risk management (Sodhi et al., 2012). Finally, because the literature focuses on prevent-
ing risks from materializing rather than on responding to materialized supplier risks, output con-
trol is generally absent in the literature (Sodhi et al., 2012). 
The supplier risk management literature contends that risk mitigation depends on a firm’s 
ability to acquire comprehensive information on potential risk triggers (Christopher and Lee, 
2004; Jüttner et al., 2003; Marucheck et al., 2011; Neiger et al., 2009). In other words, only in 
transparent supply chains can the firms mitigate supplier risks. Neiger et al. (2009: 156) highlight 
the importance of acquiring timely information for “real-time assessment, evaluation, treatment 
and monitoring of risks”. Marucheck et al. (2011: 717) also discuss the need for “real-time moni-
toring of processes across a global supply chain that allows companies to manage supplier be-
havior”. Christopher and Lee (2004: 390) further emphasize the importance of comprehensive 
information on supplier processes, warning against situations “when one member of a supply 
chain has no detailed knowledge of what goes on in other parts of the chain”. Speier et al. (2011) 
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warn that acquiring comprehensive information on potential risk triggers requires substantial ef-
fort and resources. Behavioral controls, in the guise of gathering comprehensive information to 
mitigate risks, have been the primary focus of the supplier risk management literature.  
The effect of supplier governance 
A firm’s effort to create transparent supply chains and hence to engage in risk mitigation re-
quires cooperation from suppliers. A firm is more likely to have access to comprehensive infor-
mation on supplier processes if it builds collaborative, trust-based relationships with its supplier 
(Jiang, 2009; Lamming et al., 2001; Peck, 2005). Thus, the way a firm governs its relationships 
with suppliers determines if the firm requires comprehensive information on supplier processes 
and influences how it acquires this information (e.g., Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Whipple and 
Roh, 2010). Supplier governance refers to a set of mechanisms a firm employs to coordinate and 
control exchanges with its suppliers (Mahapatra et al., 2010). The supplier governance literature 
distinguishes among behavior-based contractual, outcome-based contractual and relational gov-
ernance mechanisms.    
Under relational governance, a firm relies on interpersonal relationships and “implicit and ex-
plicit understandings” (Bensaou and Anderson, 1999: 462). Relational governance emphasizes 
the importance of bonds between a firm and its suppliers (Nyaga et al., 2010; Poppo and Zenger, 
2002; Wathne and Heide, 2004). Rather than relying on a contract, “mutual respect, trust, and 
close interaction that exists between the partner firms” (Cousins et al., 2006: 853) empower this 
governance mechanism. A firm is likely to use relational governance if it believes that its suppli-
ers are trustworthy and thus motivated to comply with its requirements (Joshi and Campbell, 
2003; Poppo and Zenger, 2002). When the firm relies on this governance mechanism it assumes 
that its suppliers value relationship continuity (Jiang, 2009; Joshi and Campbell, 2003; Nyaga et 
14 
 
al., 2010). That is, the focus is on creating relational ties that “influence or restrain a [supplier’s] 
actions’’ (Palmatier, 2008: 77). At the same time, Poppo and Zinger (2002) emphasize that close 
relational ties do not presuppose that no formal contract exists between a firm and a supplier; in-
stead, the ties enable the relationships. 
Relational ties enable behavior control since they encourage suppliers to share information on 
their processes with buying firms (Barratt and Oke, 2007; Johnston et al., 2004; Speier et al., 
2011). For instance, a supplier is more likely to disclose the social and environmental aspects of 
its operations if its relationship with a buyer is candid and long-term oriented (Bendixen and 
Abratt, 2007; Roth et al., 2008).  Jiang (2009) empirically shows that suppliers are more likely to 
commit to supplier codes of conduct if a buying firm relies on relational governance. Cousins et 
al. (2006: 856) argue that close social ties are associated with such benefits as “lower costs, im-
proved delivery, fewer quality problems, early insights into new technologies, on-time product 
launches, and others.”  Firms are likely to employ relational governance in industries with com-
plex production (Jiang, 2009; Mahapatra et al., 2010; Poppo and Zenger, 2002), because they 
require frequent interactions with suppliers, and close relationships enable more effective com-
munication.  
Yet, under some circumstances relational governance can fail to lead to desired outcomes. 
Villena et al. (2011) emphasize that a firm’s excessive reliance on cooperation and trust can lead 
to opportunistic supplier behavior. Telser (1980: 27) highlights the fragile nature of relational 
ties and argues that the ties last as long as ‘‘each party believes to be better off by continuing the 
agreement than [it] would be by ending it’’. Poppo and Zenger (2010) argue that for firms with 
large supply bases, fostering close relationships is a resource intensive practice. Link and Marxt 
15 
 
(2004) highlight that cooperative relationships often suffer from irregular and fragmented ex-
change of information between partners. 
Under contractual governance a firm relies on a legally binding agreement to guide its ex-
changes with suppliers. This agreement focuses either on the supplier behavior or on the out-
comes they need to achieve (Mahapatra et al., 2010). The key principle behind behavior-based 
contractual governance is to source from suppliers with processes that satisfy a firm’s require-
ments (Heide et al., 2007; Whipple and Roh, 2010). Since suppliers may choose to ignore these 
requirements, a firm relying on this governance mechanism needs to engage in behavioral con-
trol by “[gathering] information about supplier behavior and then influencing that behavior, thus 
achieving higher supplier compliance” (Selviaridis and Norrman, 2014: 156). Nevertheless, 
some suppliers may not allow the firm to oversee their processes, because they have serious op-
erational issues they wish to conceal (Gümüs et al., 2012) or they are concerned that allowing a 
buyer to oversee their processes may lead to opportunistic behavior such as a buyer using the in-
formation to leverage its bargaining power (Saeed et al., 2005). In contrast, outcome-based con-
tractual governance focuses on specifying the performance requirements suppliers need to 
achieve (Heide et al., 2007; Selviaridis and Norrman, 2014; Whipple and Roh, 2010). Firms rely-
ing on this governance mechanism do not oversee supplier processes. Instead, they assume that 
proper processes are in place if outcome goals are met (Eishenhardt, 1989A; Selviaridis and 
Norrman, 2014). At the same time, the effectiveness of outcome-based contractual governance 
depends on a supplier’s willingness to achieve the required outcomes. In addition, this govern-
ance mechanism can fail if a supplier lacks capabilities to perform at the level that a contract pre-
scribes (Simpson et al., 2012; Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2010). As a result, firms tend to use 
this governance mechanism when the uncertainty of suppliers achieving the outcomes is low, 
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e.g., when they source relatively simple products. Firms also rely on outcome-based contractual 
governance if they prioritize cost minimization in procurement (Jiang, 2009; Mahapatra et al., 
2010). 
In summary, governance mechanism influences whether a firm can create transparent supply 
chain. Under relational governance, a firm’s supplier may grant access to comprehensive infor-
mation on supplier processes because the relationships with the firm are mutually open. Under 
behavior-based contractual governance, a firm can choose suppliers that agree with having such 
a requirement in a contract. Finally, under outcome-based contractual governance, a firm is un-
likely to seek comprehensive information on supplier processes. 
The effect of supply chain complexity 
Many modern supply chains are complex networks that consist of multiple tiers with a large 
number of suppliers in each tier (Skilton and Robinson, 2009). The complexity of supply chains 
increased as the firms started dealing with “[higher] number of suppliers in the supply base, 
[greater] level of supplier interaction, and [an increasing] degree to which these suppliers vary in 
terms of organizational culture, size, location, technology, and so on” (Choi and Krause, 2006: 
638). With the increased complexity of supply chains, it becomes harder and costlier to ensure 
supplier compliance (Fawcett et al., 2012; Mena et al., 2013; Speier et al., 2011). In such supply 
chains, firms often face fragmented information flows: information sources are harder to identify 
and incoming information is often unreliable (Pathak et al., 2007). 
In global supply chains, firms face the additional challenge of managing relationships with 
suppliers of diverse cultural and national backgrounds (Awaysheh and Klassen, 2010). The 
choice of country, from which firms choose to source, may impair the ability to gain reliable in-
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formation from their suppliers (Awaysheh and Klassen, 2010; Bhattacharyya et al., 2010). In 
many developing countries, the flow of information is restricted, and governmental institutions 
tend to overlook various issues ranging from human rights violations to poor product security. 
This institutional environment inhibits firms’ ability to ensure that their suppliers adhere to the 
imposed requirements (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999). Furthermore, the trend towards global sourc-
ing has inhibited firms’ ability to establish the origins of their product components. This issue is 
especially salient in industries with high product safety concerns, such as baby food industry 
(Lamberti and Lettieri, 2009). Finally, Fine (2013) offers a general critique of current global 
sourcing practices. He notes that the trend towards global sourcing was a cost cutting initiative 
that had exposed firms to greater levels of supplier risks. Fine argues for a more “intelligent” ap-
proach to sourcing that takes into account both potential returns and risks. 
While we still lack a full understanding of how to manage complex supply chains, a number 
of important findings have emerged in the literature. Ellis et al. (2011) highlight the benefits of 
closer proximity to suppliers, as distance tends to increase uncertainty. A number of authors ar-
gue that the only way to manage lower-tier suppliers is via direct interaction (Mena et al., 2013; 
Wagner, 2010; Wagner and Silveira-Camargos, 2012). This last measure also helps to increase 
the reliability of the information acquired from the supply chain (Speier et al., 2011) 
In summary, the literature agrees that high complexity of supply chain inhibits a firm’s ability 
to create transparent supply chains to ensure compliance. In general, the simpler the structure of 
the supply chain is, the easier it is for a firm to acquire information on supplier processes. At the 
same time, it is not clear what aspects of modern supply chains play the most important role in 
hindering a firm’s ability to acquire this information. Moreover, manufacturers of complex prod-
ucts often cannot significantly reduce complexity of their supply chains. Yet, we lack under-
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standing on how these firms should ensure supplier compliance despite having complex supply 
chains.  
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CHAPTER THREE: MULTIPLE CASE STUDIES  
The literature has long acknowledged that firms are both internally and externally driven to 
acquire comprehensive information to ensure supplier compliance (e.g., New, 2010; Marucheck 
et al., 2011; Christopher and Lee, 2004). Furthermore, we understand that a firm’s supplier gov-
ernance mechanism and complexity of its supply chains are likely to influence the firm’s efforts 
to acquire this information. At the same time, we still do not fully understand how firms do it. 
This gap in the literature calls for an empirical investigation.  
Qualitative methods are highly desirable for emergent research topics (Yin, 2014). The use of 
field data can provide a more in-depth understanding of organizational processes (Eisenhardt, 
1989B; Pagell et al., 2014). Operations management scholars favor multiple case studies over a 
single case study, due to greater generalizability and easier replication (Barratt et al., 2011). 
Thus, the first stage of the research is a series of case studies of firms that are actively engaged in 
acquiring information required to ensure supplier compliance.  
Case study description 
Sampling strategy 
Multiple case study research designs benefit from theoretical sampling, because it allows the 
incorporation of existing knowledge by taking into account themes emphasized by the literature 
(Eisenhardt, 1989B; Miles and Huberman, 1994) and ultimately makes the results more general-
izable and replicative (Pagell et al., 2014). Thus, to develop a better understanding of how firms 
acquire comprehensive information on supplier processes, I used the relevant literature to con-
struct a 2´2´2 sampling matrix. The first dimension of the matrix captures a driver pressuring 
firms to acquire information on supplier processes to ensure compliance. The literature high-
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lights two drivers: a firm’s own vulnerability to supplier risks and the stakeholder pressure. The 
former is an internal driver and the latter is an external driver. It was difficult to determine the 
dominant driver a priori. For that reason, I had instead identified whether for a firm a certain 
driver was present; that is, I sampled firms that were at least to some extent internally driven and 
firms that were at least to some extent externally driven. Namely, the performance of the four 
internally driven firms in the sample can be significantly undermined by supplier non-
compliance and for that reason they are driven to acquire information on supplier processes. In 
contrast, the four externally driven firms in the sample are expected to acquire information on 
supplier processes to satisfy stakeholder demands.  
The second dimension captures how a firm governs relationships with its suppliers. The litera-
ture shows that a firm’s supplier governance affects whether a firm can access comprehensive 
information on supplier processes (e.g., Jiang, 2009; Poppo and Zenger, 2002). Since I could not 
easily identify how a firm governs its relationships with suppliers a priori, I used firm size as a 
proxy. I chose this proxy because small firms often lack power over their suppliers and are more 
likely to engage in relational governance than their larger counterparts (Lepoutre and Heene, 
2006). Firm size corresponds to the number of full-time employees. Firms with 500 or more em-
ployees are considered to be large and firms with fewer than 500 employees are considered to be 
small (Tether, 1998). 
The third dimension is supply chain complexity. The literature agrees that high supply chain 
complexity inhibits a firm’s ability to acquire comprehensive information on supplier processes 
to ensure compliance (e.g., Awaysheh and Klassen, 2010; Bhattacharyya et al., 2010).  Similarly 
to the other dimensions, the complexity of a firm’s supply chain could not be assessed a priori.  
Therefore, I used a firm’s product complexity as a proxy for supply chain complexity. I opera-
21 
 
tionalized product complexity via three dimensions: difficulty to produce and develop products 
due to product design architecture, number of distinct components in a purchased product, and 
level of interaction between these components (Closs et al., 2008; Mahapatra et al., 2010; Novak 
and Eppinger, 2001). 
Sample  
Eisenhardt (1989B) recommends sample size for multiple case studies to be between four and 
ten cases, but notes that data collection should continue until researchers have reached the point 
of theoretical saturation, when “incremental learning is minimal because the researchers are ob-
serving phenomena seen before” (p. 545). I reached that point after collecting the seventh case. 
Yet, the data collection continued until an eighth case to confirm that theoretical saturation has 
been reached and to have two firms in each cell of the sampling matrix.  
Figure 1. Sampling matrix 
The eight collected cases are firms from eight different industries, all based in Canada. During 
early contacts with the sampled firms, their representatives confirmed that their firms were ac-
tively engaged in acquiring information needed to ensure supplier compliance. Figure 1 shows 
the allocation of the eight cases along the three dimensions of the sampling matrix. Firms that 
Product complexity 
Si
ze
 
DESK (Internally driven) 
MILK (Externally driven)  
HARDWOOD (Internally driven) 
PROSCUITTO (Externally driven)  
PIPING-PARTS (Internally driven) 
AEROSPACE (Externally driven)  
AUTOMATION (Internally driven) 
AUTO-PARTS (Externally driven)   
Sm
al
l 
Low High 
La
rg
e 
Si
ze
 
Sm
al
l 
La
rg
e 
22 
 
fall under low product complexity produce relatively simple products and, as a result, source 
mainly raw materials from their suppliers: DESK is a large manufacturer that produces office 
furniture. MILK is a large company that produces a variety of dairy products. HARDWOOD is a 
small plant that processes North American woods. Finally, PROSCUITTO is a meat processing 
plant that manufactures frozen and dried pork products. Firms that fall under ‘high product com-
plexity’ category have more complex products than those in ‘low product complexity’ category. 
AUTOMATION is a large company that manufactures engineer-to-order equipment. AUTO-
PARTS is a large retailer that sells a variety of automotive products such as car mats and wiper 
blades. Finally, both PIPING-PARTS and AEROSPACE are mechanical component manufac-
turers. 
DESK and HARDWOOD rely on business models easily affected by supply disruptions, such 
as supply delays. For that reason, they are internally incentivized to prevent supplier non-
compliance. AUTOMATION and PIPING-PARTS prioritize high product quality and thus are 
internally driven to ensure that their suppliers comply with their quality requirements. MILK, 
PROSCUITTO, and AEROSPACE operate in highly regulated industries and are externally 
driven to assure high product quality of their purchases. Finally, AUTO-PARTS is under exter-
nal pressure from its customers to ensure that its products have a low defect rate. 
Level of analysis 
Each case focuses on the firm’s supply base for a specific product family. The level of analy-
sis is the supply base, but since the aim of the multiple case studies is to understand how a firm 
gains information on supplier processes, the unit of observation is the firm. Three of the firms, 
DESK, HARDWOOD and PIPING-PARTS have two distinct supply bases that provide the same 
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inputs: one where the firm perceives that it faces a negligible likelihood of non-compliance and a 
second where it faces a high likelihood of non-compliance. Consequently, for each of these firms 
there were two supply bases: DESK.R and DESK.UN, HARDWOOD.R and HARDWOOD.UN, 
PIPING-PARTS.R and PIPING-PARTS.UN, where R stands for the reliable supply base and UN 
for unreliable supply base.  
Data collection 
In each case, I collected data from multiple sources in order to ensure construct validity (Yin, 
2014). The main data sources were interviews. I used semi-structure interviews, as recommended 
for studies where concepts are underdeveloped (Miles and Huberman, 1994). The interview pro-
tocol appears in Appendix B. For each firm, I interviewed the manager responsible for procure-
ment, which is a key organizational function for this research. I also interviewed a manager re-
sponsible for customer or stakeholder relations to gain a better understanding of the role of cus-
tomers and other external stakeholders in a firm’s ability to acquire information on supplier pro-
cesses. In addition, I interviewed a manager who provided insights on the firm’s operations. In 
all four large firms, I interviewed three managers; while in small firms, responsibility for pro-
curement, customer relations, and operations often overlapped or fell on one person. In small 
firms, I interviewed two managers, with the exception of AEROSPACE where the owner pro-
vided information on all three organizational functions. Most interviews lasted 45 to 60 minutes. 
In addition, I toured the production facilities of six out of eight sampled firms. I also asked for 
relevant documentation, and collected online information. For AEROSPACE, MILK and PRO-
SCUITTO, I collected detailed documentation on how external stakeholders were involved in 
controlling the firm’s suppliers. Table 2 summarizes the data collected for each case. 
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To ensure reliability, the case study protocol guided data collection (see Appendix B). Fur-
thermore, I and another person familiar with the topic of supply chain management collected the 
case data. Each person took notes during the data collection process and all interviews were rec-
orded and then transcribed (Yin, 2014). Moreover, a researcher with expertise in supply chain 
management who was not involved in data collection verified the subsequent coding.   
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Case Firm  description 
Firm 
size Driver Collected data 
AEROSPACE 
Aerospace 
component 
manufacturer 
Small 
Stakeholder 
pressure 
Interview with the company owner 
Firm’s documentation on supplier processes requirements 
Industry certifications’ documentation on supplier compli-
ance requirements 
Field notes taken during interview and facility tour 
Information on the firm and its products retrieved from the 
firm’s website 
AUTO-PARTS 
Automotive 
component 
retailer 
Large Stakeholder pressure 
Interview with VP logistics 
Interview with a senior procurement manager  
Interview with product quality assurance manager 
Field notes taken during interviews 
Information on the firm and its products retrieved from the 
firm’s website 
AUTOMATION 
Manufacturer 
of engineer-to-
order  
automated 
equipment 
Large 
Firm’s 
vulnerability 
to supplier 
risks 
Interview with supply chain and quality manager 
Interview with the head of engineering unit 
Interview with supply chain management coordinator 
Field notes taken during interviews and facility tour 
Information on the firm and its products retrieved from the 
firm’s website 
DESK Furniture manufacturer Large 
Firm’s 
vulnerability 
to supplier 
risks 
Interview with VP purchasing 
Interview with VP manufacturing 
Interview with director of sustainability programs 
Firm’s documentation on supplier processes requirements 
Field notes taken during interviews 
Information on the firm and its products retrieved from the 
firm’s website 
HARDWOOD Hardwood producer Small 
Firm’s 
vulnerability 
to supplier 
risks 
Interview with the company owner 
Interview with the sales and purchasing manager 
Field notes taken during interviews and facility tour 
Information on the firm and its products retrieved from the 
firm’s website 
MILK Dairy  producer Large 
Stakeholder 
pressure 
Interview with VP Supply Chain Management 
Interview with VP of Sales and Marketing 
Interview with VP Operations 
Regulatory agency’s documentation on supplier compliance 
requirements 
Field notes taken during interviews and facility tour 
Information on the firm and its products retrieved from the 
firm’s website 
PIPING PARTS 
Piping  
component  
manufacturer 
Small 
Firm’s 
vulnerability 
to supplier 
risks 
Interview with Chief Operating Officer 
Interview with purchasing manager 
Field notes taken during interviews and facility tour 
Information on the firm and its products retrieved from the 
firm’s website 
PROSCUITTO Italian meats producer Small 
Stakeholder 
pressure 
Interview with the company owner 
Interview with quality assurance manager 
Sample of the firm’s supplier’s letter of guarantee 
Regulatory agency’s documentation on supplier compliance 
requirements 
Field notes taken during interviews and facility tour 
Information on the firm and its products retrieved from the 
firm’s website 
Table 2. Data collected for each case 
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Case coding and within-case analysis 
Case coding was an iterative process (Miles and Huberman, 1994). The first few iterations of 
coding were based on the initial theoretical model (Figure 2). This model was based on a sys-
tematic review of relevant literature. Appendix A describes how I conducted the literature re-
view. The initial theoretical model consisted of the following theoretical constructs: (1) the ex-
tent of supply chain transparency (i.e., the extent to which a firm is able to acquire comprehen-
sive information on supplier processes); (2) enablers; (3) drivers; (4) barriers. Following this 
model for each case study, I coded what information the firm acquired about supplier processes 
and what practices enabled the firm to do it. I also identified what drove or who pressured the 
firm to acquire this information, along with contextual factors that inhibited the firm’s ability to 
acquire this information. Later, during the within-case analysis, I elaborated the theoretical mod-
el (the process is described below) and revised the coding scheme. 
Figure 2. Initial theoretical model 
Within-case analysis was another iterative process (Miles and Huberman, 1994) aimed at de-
scribing and explaining the collected data. During the within-case analysis, I constructed a num-
ber of displays to explain the data. Ultimately, the within-case analysis included a context chart 
and an analytic text. The processes of creating the context chart and writing the analytic text 
were performed in parallel to help shape each other. The context chart displayed key theoretical 
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concepts found in each case, while the analytic text provided a detailed description of these con-
cepts.  
During the analysis, the theoretical model considerably changed. Figure 3 depicts the final 
theoretical model. The model significantly differs from the initial model because the case data 
revealed new theoretical constructs relevant to the research question. The key change is related 
to the concept of supply chain transparency, which was the focus of the initial theoretical model. 
The collected data revealed that firms that choose to create transparent relationships with their 
suppliers do not attempt to increase transparency of the entire supply chain, instead they focus on 
acquiring comprehensive information on the processes of their first-tier suppliers. Furthermore, 
the sampled firms approach supply chain transparency strictly from the perspective of supplier 
risk management. For these reasons, I omitted the concept of supply chain transparency from the 
final theoretical model and instead focused on how firms acquire comprehensive information to 
manage supplier risks. 
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Figure 3. Final theoretical model for case analysis 
Second, the data indicated that firms use different approaches to manage supplier risks. These 
approaches, in turn, relate to what information the firms acquire about suppliers. Third, the data 
show the importance of distinguishing between cases where supplier non-compliance, if materi-
alized, affects the focal firm and the non-compliant supplier, and cases where it affects only the 
focal firm. For that reason, in the revised theoretical model I added a construct specifying wheth-
er a supplier shares the negative impact of a materialized risk. Fourth, I made a firm’s supplier 
governance mechanism an explicit part of the model. Fifth, in the initial theoretical model I used 
the word ‘enabler’ to describe practices that help a firm’s efforts to acquire comprehensive in-
formation on supplier processes. The cases data clarified that enablers are contextual factors. For 
that reason, I added ‘enabling conditions’ along with ‘inhibiting conditions’ in the part of the 
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model that describes the contextual factors. Finally, in three cases, the firms rely on a third party, 
a powerful external stakeholder, that is involved in controlling and regulating the firms’ suppli-
ers. These firms then learn about supplier processes indirectly by knowing what requirements the 
involved stakeholder imposes on their suppliers. Below I briefly describe each case and provide 
a more detailed description in Appendix C.  
AEROSPACE (small firm; high product complexity; externally driven) 
AEROSPACE is a small manufacturer of customized mechanical components in the aero-
space defense industry. This industry is characterized by stable relationships among supply chain 
partners. As a result, AEROSPACE does not have many competitors, but at the same time it 
cannot easily find new customers. Customized mechanical components are a niche market where 
product quality is the main priority. AEROSPACE relies on a number of critical-to-quality sup-
pliers that provide such services as casting, anodizing, and grinding. These suppliers are a poten-
tial source of the firm’s main supplier risk, the risk of its suppliers undermining product quality.  
The risk of a supplier undermining product quality is a high impact supplier risk. The firm’s 
final customers – producers of aerospace and defense machinery – face the threat of operational 
catastrophe if non-compliant mechanical components are installed in their products. For that rea-
son, the final customers endorse supply-chain-wide adoption of industry certifications, AS9100 
and NADCAP (National Aerospace and Defense Contractors Accreditation Program). These cer-
tifications specify requirements for various types of production processes and oversee how firms 
in this industry adhere to these requirements.  
Overall, AEROSPACE’s management believes that due to the involvement of the certification 
organizations it is unlikely that one of its suppliers would undermine the quality of its products. 
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In addition, the presence of these certifications influences how the firm governs its suppliers. 
AEROSPACE engages in behavior-based supplier governance, but outsources to the certifying 
organizations monitoring of supplier processes. In addition, these organizations incentivize the 
suppliers to comply with the imposed requirements.  
AEROSPACE chooses not to acquire comprehensive information on processes of its critical-
to-quality suppliers. The firm relies on the certifying organizations to control and regulate its 
suppliers and trusts that the certification auditors properly assess the suppliers’ production capa-
bilities. Therefore, AEROSPACE manages the risk of a supplier undermining product quality by 
avoiding it. The firm is convinced that its suppliers ensure that any non-compliant components, if 
ever produced, are destroyed and would never reach the firm or its customers.  
AUTO-PARTS (large firm; high product complexity; externally driven) 
AUTO PARTS is a large retailer that specializes in automotive consumer products. Its target 
consumers are young families that prefer buying inexpensive but relatively reliable products. The 
firm faces the risk of its suppliers failing to produce products at an acceptable quality level. The 
firm is externally driven to address this risk as customer satisfaction is easily affected by poor 
product quality.  Overall, it is a low impact risk as having defective products in stock can lead to 
financial and reputational losses but the losses are unlikely to be significant.  
The firm has a large supply base located mostly offshore. AUTO-PARTS’s priority is to 
source from suppliers that can produce high volumes of products at a low cost. The product qual-
ity plays a secondary role: only once potential suppliers are chosen, the firm ensures that these 
suppliers can achieve the required quality level. As a result, the risk of a supplier failing to 
achieve acceptable quality level has high likelihood. 
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The firm interacts with its suppliers mostly during the supplier selection process. Its quality 
team visits supplier facilities to assess their manufacturing capability. If the firm selects a suppli-
er, a sample of the supplier’s products undergoes prototype testing. Once the supplier starts mass 
production the firm controls product quality via random testing.  
AUTO-PARTS relies on outcome-based supplier governance. The firm sources from suppli-
ers that can achieve the needed outcomes: producing high volumes of low-cost products of ac-
ceptable quality. Overall, the firm assumes that suppliers are able to achieve the needed outcome 
levels, unless there are indications of non-compliance. As a result, AUTO-PARTS is willing to 
tolerate a certain level of the supplier risk and tends to address the risk only if it materializes and 
only if the costs associated with the non-compliant supplier are significant.  
AUTOMATION (large firm; high product complexity; internally driven) 
AUTOMATION is a large company that manufactures engineer-to-order equipment. The 
firm’s customers, OEMs, put significant cost pressures and choose to source from AUTOMA-
TION because of its ability to achieve the required product quality level despite the cost pres-
sures. The firm is forced to source from suppliers that can provide low-cost components of ac-
ceptable quality facing a high-likelihood risk of its suppliers failing to achieve the required prod-
uct quality level.  
The firm is internally driven to address this risk. It strives to protect its reputation as a firm 
known for its ability to provide acceptable quality products despite the high cost pressures. Yet, 
this is a low impact risk. The firm’s customers accept that some of the components the firm pro-
cures can lead to a product failure.  
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For each engineer-to-order project the firm selects component suppliers on the open market. 
On a regular basis, AUTOMATION deals with between 80 to 120 external component suppliers. 
The firm relies on outcome-based supplier governance seeking suppliers that can provide the 
needed outcomes: low cost components of an acceptable quality level. To ensure that its suppli-
ers can produce products of acceptable quality, the firm engages its engineers when it selects 
suppliers. The engineers assess the manufacturing capabilities of a potential supplier. If there is 
evidence that the supplier is able to provide acceptable quality, the firm requests a sample order 
for destructive testing to further confirm that the supplier has the required quality system in 
place.  
AUTOMATION has a certain tolerance for the supplier risk and hence chooses not to work 
with customers who are more risk adverse. Moreover, the firm is prepared that over time some of 
its suppliers will fail to achieve the required product quality becoming non-compliant. It is only 
when the risk of supplier non-compliance materializes that does the firm increase control of the 
non-compliant supplier or finds a new supplier.  
DESK.R (large firm; low product complexity; internally driven) 
DESK.R is a contract furniture manufacturer that specializes in customized office furniture. 
The firm’s final customers include law firms, universities, and Fortune 500 companies. The con-
tract furniture market segment faces increasing customer expectations. The firm’s ability to meet 
customer requirements while remaining efficient internally makes the firm one of the few large 
furniture manufacturers with production facilities located in Canada. 
As a contract manufacturer, DESK.R does not produce products to stock and hence faces 
short lead times. As a result, the firm’s main supplier risk is a supplier non-compliance that can 
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delay orders and negatively affect their reputation among their customers. This is a low impact 
supplier risk: while supplier non-compliance will delay the firm’s fulfillment of a particular cus-
tomer order, it is unlikely to severely affect its reputation.  
The firm works with 80 main suppliers. Most of its suppliers produce commodity products 
and raw materials. The firm’s management believes that these suppliers have sufficient capabili-
ties as well as incentives to fulfill orders following the firm’s requirements. With these suppliers, 
the firm relies on relational governance. Over time, the firm developed close ties with its suppli-
ers investing significant resources in supplier development and helping them adapt to the in-
creasing industry requirements. Furthermore, DESK.R does not require the suppliers to have cost 
reduction initiatives, thus limiting cost pressures on its suppliers. The firm also ensures that its 
suppliers have sufficient capabilities to produce the needed amount of product within a short 
time window following the firm’s requirements for product and processes.  
Overall, the firm is convinced that its suppliers have both sufficient capabilities and incentives 
to fulfill orders following the firm’s requirements. The firm’s management believes that when 
they procure from these suppliers the likelihood of supplier non-compliance is low. In fact, close 
relational ties make it unnecessary to acquire comprehensive information on supplier processes 
as relational governance allows the firm to avoid the risk of supplier non-compliance.  
DESK.UN (large firm; low product complexity; internally driven) 
This case focuses on the same firm sourcing the same inputs as in DESK.R but considers how 
this firm sources from a supply base consisting of unreliable suppliers. This supply base is of 
considerably smaller size than the firm’s supply base of reliable suppliers. The firm sources from 
unreliable suppliers, because it faces short lead times and thus has to procure the majority of its 
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raw materials locally. Some of its local suppliers tend to lack production capabilities and, as a 
result, over time are likely to cause a non-compliance.  
These are mostly small local suppliers of raw materials. They tend to struggle to adapt to 
emerging industry requirements and do not have sufficient knowledge of new trends in the indus-
try. These factors necessitate the firm to have a greater level of oversight of processes of these 
suppliers.  
Specifically, with these suppliers, DESK.UN engages in behavior-based contractual govern-
ance. First, the firm makes sure that the suppliers agree to adhere to its terms and conditions. 
However, because of low capabilities the suppliers may fail to comply with the firm’s order re-
quirements. For that reason, the firm assigns employees to remain in facilities of these suppliers 
and ensure that the suppliers engage in processes that comply with the firm’s requirements. Ac-
quiring information on supplier processes enables the firm’s governance mechanism and allows 
it to mitigate the risk of supplier non-compliance. If any of these suppliers sufficiently improve 
their processes, the firm starts to rely on the relational governance mechanism and stops directly 
acquiring comprehensive information on supplier processes. 
HARDWOOD.R (small firm; low product complexity; internally driven)  
This case focuses on a small hardwood producer. The firm seeks to procure timber of high 
quality and carries a diverse inventory that its competitors choose not to stock. HARDWOOD.R 
is in a weak market position: some of the firm’s current customers seek to procure directly from 
its suppliers and some of its largest suppliers are its main competitors.  
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The firm’s suppliers are sawmills located in the United States and Canada. On a regular basis, 
the firm sources from 30 to 50 saw mills. The firm faces supplier non-compliances both in terms 
of wood quality or delivery time. This supplier risk has low potential impact. If materialized, this 
risk will cause short-term financial losses and disrupt the firm’s processes, but is unlikely to have 
lasting negative effects on the firm. HARDWOOD.R is internally driven to address this supplier 
risk and prefers working with suppliers it believes to be reliable. The firm’s management be-
lieves that these suppliers are associated with low likelihood of non-compliance. Over time these 
suppliers have demonstrated their ability to provide a reliable supply of high quality timber.  
The firm relies on relational governance to manage these suppliers. It trusts the suppliers and 
does not directly oversee how the suppliers prepare the ordered wood. Instead, the firm’s man-
agement fosters close relational ties with these suppliers. In addition, some of these suppliers are 
dependent on the firm’s expertise in wood grading. Overall, long-term relationships, trust, and 
mutual dependence enable the firm’s governance mechanism.  
HARDWOOD.R seeks to avoid the supplier risk when it sources from suppliers it views as 
reliable. The firm expects that these suppliers will remain responsive to its requirements for 
wood quality and delivery times. It chooses not to oversee how the suppliers fulfill its orders and 
instead believes that relational ties allow it to avoid risk.  
HARDWOOD.UN (small firm; low product complexity; internally driven) 
This case considers the same firm as in HARDWOOD.R but sourcing timber from a different 
supply base. This supply base consists of suppliers that the firm views as being unreliable. The 
firm’s supply chain has been consolidated, and as a result, the firm cannot be as selective about 
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dealing only with suppliers with proven reliability. For that reason, the firm is willing to procure 
from suppliers that are known for supplying wood of inferior quality or delaying shipments.  
These suppliers are not motivated to comply with the firm’s requirements, and the firm is 
forced to control supplier processes by engaging in behavior-based contractual governance. The 
firm ensures that these suppliers comply with its order requirements by having an employee lo-
cated close to suppliers’ facilities who controls how suppliers fulfill the firm’s orders. The em-
ployee travels to the suppliers’ facilities and oversees how they prepare wood for the shipment.  
With its unreliable suppliers, HARDWOOD.UN cannot avoid the risk of supplier non-
compliance. For that reason, with these suppliers the firm focuses on mitigating the likelihood of 
supplier non-compliance by relying on behavior-based contractual governance. It employs an 
agent who oversees supplier processes and ensures that suppliers do not trigger a non-
compliance.  
MILK (large firm; low product complexity; externally driven) 
MILK is a large Canadian dairy firm that produces a variety of dairy products. The firm’s top 
priority is high product quality. In fact, the firm is able to attract many of its customers because 
of its reputation as a quality-focused firm.  
The product quality depends on sourcing from farms that eliminate any potential triggers of 
milk contamination. The risk of its suppliers supplying contaminated milk is the main supplier 
risk MILK faces. If materialized, this supplier risk will have high impact on the firm: it would 
disrupt its supply chain processes but more importantly would have long-term negative effect on 
its reputation. The firm faces significant external drivers to ensure high quality of the procured 
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milk. Its large customers put significant pressures on the firm to control the risk of product con-
tamination and impose strict policies for quality assurance measures.  
The firm procures fresh milk from Ontario milk farmers via Dairy Farmers of Ontario (DFO), 
a governmental agency that controls milk supply in the province. The DFO acts as an intermedi-
ary supplier between milk farms and milk processing plants. The firm is not allowed to procure 
milk from any other sources. At the same time, Ontario farms are constrained by regulation to 
having the DFO as their only customer.  
In general, hazards that have potential to trigger milk contamination are present in daily oper-
ations of milk farms. However, the aim of the DFO quality program that the farmers adhere to is 
to eliminate potential food safety hazards. Due to the DFO’s role in the supply chain, the likeli-
hood of farm supplying contaminated milk is low. 
The involvement of the DFO allows MILK to rely on behavior-based contractual governance. 
The firm outsources to the DFO the efforts to assure that suppliers have the required processes in 
place. This stakeholder oversees on an ongoing basis whether practices of licensed farms comply 
with the established requirements. In addition, the DFO conducts its own testing of milk and en-
sures traceability of milk to a particular farm. In other words, it is the DFO that ensures that sup-
pliers have needed process in place.  
Because of the DFO’s involvement, the firm does not participate in supplier selection and 
does not allocate resources towards acquiring information on supplier processes. MILK address-
es the risk of a supplier producing contaminated milk by avoiding it. The firm is fully dependent 
on the DFO’s ability to ensure compliance of the milk farms. It does not oversee production of 
these farms nor does it know from which farms each milk truck comes from.  
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PIPING-PARTS.R (small firm; high product complexity; internally driven) 
PIPING-PARTS.R is a small pipeline component manufacturer that sources semi-finished 
components from four North American suppliers. The firm sells its products to piping companies 
in the oil and gas industry. This industry is sensitive to product defects. For that reason, to attract 
customers the firm emphasizes its high product quality. Its customers do not monitor production 
of the firm or of its suppliers but expect that the firm will operate according to its reputation. 
High product quality requires procuring defect-free semi-finished components from suppliers. 
Therefore, the firm’s main supplier risk is a supplier producing a defective component. This sup-
plier risk has high potential impact. If installed in a pipe, a defective component may later crack 
under pressure and cause an operational disaster. The firm is internally driven to address this risk 
as its market presence depends on maintaining its reputation of a firm that prioritizes quality.  
From its four North American suppliers, PIPING-PARTS.R sources non-standard products in 
small volumes or when a customer requests a rush order. The firm believes that when it procures 
from these suppliers the likelihood of procuring a non-compliant component is low. The reason 
is that these suppliers follow a business model similar to the firm’s: they attract customers be-
cause they are known for their emphasis on product quality. The firm management believes that 
it does not need to oversee processes of these suppliers because of their organization culture that 
emphasizes high product quality. Aligned vision on the importance of product quality makes it 
possible for the firm to rely on relational governance. Overall, the firm trusts that these suppliers 
would perform according to the firm’s expectations and requirements.  
With these suppliers, PIPING-PARTS.R focuses on risk avoidance. It believes that the viabil-
ity of these suppliers depends on maintaining their reputation and therefore they are unlikely to 
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produce defective components. The firm chooses not to acquire comprehensive information on 
their production processes. Instead, it trusts that over time the suppliers will remain compliant.  
PIPING-PARTS.UN (small firm; high product complexity; internally driven) 
This case considers the same firm as in PIPING-PARTS.R sourcing the same type of products 
(semi-finished components) but from a different supply base. This supply base consists of 18 
offshore suppliers. From them the firm procures components of standard design in high volumes. 
These suppliers are associated with the same supplier risk of high potential impact as in PIPING-
PARTS.R: a supplier producing a defective component. Unlike its North American supply base, 
these suppliers are associated with a high likelihood of supplier risk. The firm believes that its 
offshore suppliers lack capabilities to assure that no defects are introduced to the components. In 
addition, these suppliers are known for their cost-cutting organizational culture and for prioritiz-
ing profits over product quality.  
PIPING-PARTS.UN does not trust that the offshore suppliers can produce high quality prod-
ucts on consistent basis. For that reason, the firm relies on behavior-based contractual govern-
ance. The firm agrees to source from these suppliers only if they follow detailed requirements for 
critical-to-quality production processes. In addition, to ensure compliance the firm has an off-site 
team that monitors the processes and remains in the suppliers’ facilities until the produced prod-
ucts are shipped out to the firm. The firm’s management believes that the off-site team should 
control production even of its long-term offshore suppliers.  
With its offshore suppliers, the firm engages in behavior-based contractual governance. Its 
management believes that these suppliers cannot sufficiently avoid the risk of manufacturing de-
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fective components. For that reason, the firm oversees each step of production to be able to miti-
gate potential supplier non-compliances.  
PROSCUITTO (small firm; low product complexity; externally driven) 
PROSCUITTO is a small meat processing plant that produces cured, cooked, and frozen Ital-
ian meat products. The firm is a plant with a federal license, the highest standard in the meat pro-
cessing industry. Being a federal plant gives the firm a right to sell across Canada and to export 
but at the same time puts it under the highest level of regulatory control.  
The only meat ingredient the firm uses in its products is pork. It is the firm’s main expense in 
procurement and its critical-to-quality purchase. The firm mainly procures meat from a single 
federal slaughterhouse. The main risk PROSCUITTO faces is sourcing from a supplier that pro-
duces contaminated meat. This is a high-impact supplier risk. The firm is under significant exter-
nal pressure from the federal regulator to avoid product contamination. The firm will be held re-
sponsible even if the contamination is originated in the supplier’s slaughterhouse.  
At the same time, the firm believes that the likelihood of the supplier supplying a contaminat-
ed product is low. In general, food safety hazards are present in daily operations of slaughter-
houses. However, to ensure that federal slaughterhouses eliminate the hazards their processes are 
controlled and regulated by a powerful external stakeholder, the Canadian Food Inspection 
Agency (CFIA). CFIA inspectors are on the staff of federal slaughterhouses; they ensure that 
production processes comply with the regulatory requirements. 
CFIA’s involvement influences how the firm governs its meat suppliers. The firm relies on 
behavior-based contractual governance, with the key aspects of this governance mechanism ena-
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bled by the CFIA. The agency assigns inspectors to oversee all aspects of the slaughterhouse’s 
production from purchasing to slaughtering to shipping. In addition, CFIA incentivizes the 
slaughterhouse to eliminate any potential triggers of product contamination.  
The firm does not allocate resources towards acquiring comprehensive information on suppli-
er processes and outsources these efforts to the CFIA. It relies on behavior-based relational gov-
ernance with the supplier processes controlled by the involved stakeholder and not the firm. The 
firm avoids the supplier risk of procuring contaminated meat to the extent largely determined by 
the effectiveness of the CFIA involvement.  
Cross-Case Analysis 
Based on Miles and Huberman’s (1994) guidelines, the cross-case analysis began with con-
structing tables with the cases ordered in various ways based on the concepts identified during 
the within-case analysis. This process took a number of iterations. Some variables that the supply 
chain management literature predicted to have explanatory power failed to sufficiently explain 
how firms acquire information on supplier processes. For instance, both firm size and complexity 
of its products were used to create the sampling matrix for this research (Figure 1), as the litera-
ture highlights the importance of these variables in this context. However, neither variable could 
suggest how firms acquire information on supplier processes to ensure supplier compliance. In 
fact, these two variables could explain the logic of only two cases, AUTOMATION and AUTO-
PARTS. In both cases, large firms have products that fall under the ‘high product complexity’ 
column of the sampling matrix. The firms are also similar in how they acquire information to 
ensure supplier compliance. Yet, these two variables could not explain the logic of the remaining 
cases.  
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Next iterations in the analysis revealed that the more promising approach was to focus on var-
iables related to supplier risk. I first ordered the cases based on the potential risk impact. This 
approach revealed a number of unexpected patterns. For instance, it showed that the three cases 
with the supply bases controlled by external stakeholders – AEROSPACE, MILK, and PRO-
SCUITTO – faced high impact supplier risk. In fact, high impact risk helps to explain why the 
firms in these cases rely on involved powerful stakeholders: these stakeholders are perceived to 
eliminate the triggers of supplier non-compliance. Also, in the two cases, AUTO-PARTS and 
AUTOMATION, where the firms tolerate supplier risks, both were associated with a low impact 
risk. The low impact of the supplier risk explains why these firms tolerate supplier non-
compliances: if materialized, supplier non-compliance is unlikely to have a lasting negative im-
pact on the firms’ reputation and financial standing. The risk impact, however, failed to suffi-
ciently explain the logic in the remaining six cases. 
The next iteration focused on approaches each firm takes to address the risk of supplier non-
compliance. In this iteration, I was able to explain the logic in all the cases. Based on the risk 
management literature, I identified three approaches to supplier risk management relevant to this 
study. PIPING-PARTS.UN, HARDWOOD.UN, and DESK.UN engage in risk mitigation. The 
firms oversee their suppliers’ operations because they believe that their suppliers, if not moni-
tored, are associated with high likelihood of non-compliance. This group includes cases with 
supplier risks of both high and low impact. By acquiring information on supplier processes, these 
firms can identify potential triggers of non-compliance and hence mitigate their likelihood. AU-
TOMATION and AUTO-PARTS form another group. In these two cases, the supply bases are 
associated with high likelihood of non-compliance but the risk has low impact on the firms. In 
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this group, the firms choose to engage in risk tolerance and address supplier risks only if they 
materialize.  
In the remaining cases, the firms find ways to avoid supplier non-compliance by taking two 
different paths to achieve risk avoidance. AEROSPACE, MILK, and PROSCUITTO engage in 
stakeholder enabled risk avoidance. They rely on powerful external stakeholders that are in-
volved in controlling and regulating their suppliers. All three cases have supply bases with po-
tential to have high impact on the focal firms. Simultaneously, due to stakeholder involvement 
the firms perceive that the likelihood of non-compliance is low. As a result, the focal firms out-
source to the involved stakeholders the efforts of acquiring comprehensive information on sup-
plier processes to ensure supplier compliance. PIPING-PARTS.R, HARDWOOD.R, and 
DESK.R engage in relationship enabled risk avoidance. This group includes cases with both 
high and low impact supplier risks. These firms are convinced that their suppliers have both suf-
ficient capabilities and motivation to comply with order requirements. As a result, they have es-
tablished close relational ties with these suppliers and believe that the suppliers are likely to re-
main compliant. Overall, the process of ordering cases by an approach firms take to address sup-
plier risks revealed four distinct case groups (Table 3).  
Then I analyzed what other factors cases in each group had in common. Table 4 summarizes 
these factors and the section below provides a more detailed overview of each group. In particu-
lar, this analysis revealed that the four case groups differ not only in their approaches of address-
ing supplier risks, but also in their supplier governance mechanisms. Finally, I created a path di-
agram that compares the four identified case groups. Shown in Figure 4, the diagram reveals how 
different supply chain characteristics shape the approach to supplier risks and how the supplier 
governance mechanism enables this approach.  
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Case 
group Case 
Firm  
description 
Firm 
size 
Product 
complexity 
Risk  
impact 
High  
supplier  
capabilities  
Likelihood 
of non-
compliance 
Description of firm’s supply base 
1 
AEROSPACE 
Aerospace  
component  
manufacturer 
Small High High Yes Low 
Approx. 15 local suppliers providing critical-to-quality 
manufacturing services. Some are integrated. All sup-
pliers are certified by industry certification agency. 
MILK Dairy  producer Large Low High Yes Low 
3,000 local milk suppliers. A regulatory agency dis-
tributes milk in the industry and manages milk suppli-
ers. The suppliers are licensed by the agency and ad-
here to agency's production requirements 
PROSCUITTO Meat products manufacturer Small Low High Yes Low 
Single local meat supplier licenced by a regulatory 
agency. The agency monitors supplier operations on a 
daily basis and manages non-compliances. 
2 
DESK.R Furniture  manufacturer Large Low Low Yes Low 
The firm procures in total from 80 raw material sup-
pliers. The suppliers are mostly local. They have pro-
duction capabilities sufficient to cope with increasing 
customer requirements. 
HARDWOOD.R Hardwood  producer Small Low Low Yes Low 
The firm procures in total from 30 suppliers. Geo-
graphically clustered consolidated supply base of 
sawmills. Suppliers have close relationship with the 
firm and some rely on the firm to grade the wood. 
PIPING-PARTS.R 
Piping  
component  
manufacturer 
Small High High Yes Low 
Three North American suppliers of semi-finished 
components. Suppliers have demonstrated their relia-
bility and the reputation of quality-focused firms. 
3 
DESK.UN Furniture  manufacturer Large Low Low No High 
Firm procures in total from 80 raw material suppliers. 
The suppliers are mostly small and local. The suppli-
ers lack capabilities to cope with increasing customer 
requirements. Many face bankruptcy. 
HARDWOOD.UN Hardwood  producer Small Low Low Yes High 
Firm procures in total from 30 suppliers. Geograph-
ically clustered supply base of sawmills. Mostly large 
suppliers that are also the firm's main competitors 
PIPING-PARTS.UN 
Piping  
component  
manufacturer 
Small High High No High 18 suppliers in India with potential to be compliant but lack production capabilities and incentives. 
4 
AUTO-PARTS 
Automotive 
component  
retailer 
Large High Low No High Offshore supply base of approx. 500 suppliers. Many suppliers of seasonal and slow-moving products. 
AUTOMATION 
Manufacturer of 
engineer-to-
order equipment 
Large High Low No High 
Approximately 80 component suppliers. Some are 
local. The firm selects new suppliers for each engi-
neer-to-order project. 
Table 3. Description of case groups 
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Group Case 
Supplier 
shares 
risk 
impact 
Acquiring 
information 
on 
supplier 
processes 
Focus on 
stable  
supply base 
Cost 
pressures 
Focus of 
communication 
with suppliers 
Governance  
mechanism 
Approach to 
supplier risk 
1 
AEROSPACE Yes Periodic; by stakeholder 
Stakeholder  
enabled Low 
Compliance to 
stakeholder require-
ments 
Stakeholder-enabled 
behavior-based 
contractual governance 
Risk 
avoidance 
MILK Yes Direct; by stakeholder 
Stakeholder  
enabled 
Stakeholder  
regulated No 
Stakeholder-enabled 
behavior-based 
contractual governance 
Risk 
avoidance 
PROSCUITTO Yes Direct; by stakeholder 
Stakeholder  
enabled High 
Compliance to 
stakeholder require-
ments 
Stakeholder-enabled 
behavior-based 
contractual governance 
Risk 
avoidance 
2 
DESK.R Yes None Strong Low 
Relationship & 
compliance to firm’s 
requirements 
Relational governance Risk avoidance 
HARDWOOD.R Yes None Strong Low 
Relationship & 
compliance to firm’s 
requirements 
Relational governance Risk avoidance 
PIPING-PARTS.R Yes None Strong Low Compliance to firm’s requirements Relational governance 
Risk 
avoidance 
3 
DESK.UN Yes Direct Strong Low Compliance to firm’s requirements 
Behavior-based 
contractual governance 
Risk 
mitigation 
HARDWOOD.UN No Direct Strong NA Compliance to firm’s requirements 
Behavior-based 
contractual governance 
Risk 
mitigation 
PIPING-PARTS.UN No Direct Strong Low Compliance to firm’s requirements 
Behavior-based 
contractual governance 
Risk 
mitigation 
4 
AUTO-PARTS No None Weak High Outcomes Outcome-based contractual governance 
Risk 
tolerance 
AUTOMATION No None Weak High Outcomes Outcome-based contractual governance 
Risk 
tolerance 
Table 4. Description of factors common among firms in each case group 
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Overview of Four Case Groups 
Case Group 1: Stakeholder enabled risk avoidance  
This group includes MILK, PROSCUITTO and AEROSPACE. The first two firms are in the 
food industry and the last one is in the defense industry. The impact of supplier non-compliance 
is high for all of them. The involvement of powerful external stakeholders in each of these firms’ 
supply bases is the reason they form a separate group. For these supply bases, external stake-
holders participate in selecting suppliers, acquiring information on supplier processes, and incen-
tivizing suppliers to comply with necessary requirements for their production processes. As a 
result, of the stakeholder’s involvement, these firms believe they can avoid supplier non-
compliance. 
MILK and PROSCUITTO face the risk of a supplier producing contaminated ingredients. To 
eliminate potential triggers of contamination, government agencies regulate and control their 
supply bases. These regulatory agencies license potential suppliers, set the requirements for sup-
plier processes and then ensure that licensed suppliers conform to these requirements. AERO-
SPACE faces the risk of its suppliers, undermining the quality of the mechanical components it 
sells. It thus only selects licensed suppliers that have gained a third-party certification from aero-
space certifying organizations. These third party certifying organizations ensure that suppliers 
have sufficient capabilities to maintain high product quality by acquiring information on these 
suppliers and assessing if they conform to the process requirements developed for their specific 
types of production.  
Case Group 1 firms rely on behavior-based contractual governance with key elements of this 
governance mechanism enabled by the powerful stakeholders. Specifically, they source only 
from suppliers that have been licensed by the stakeholders, which in turn only license those with 
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the potential to comply with industry-specific production process requirements. Losing the li-
cense threatens suppliers’ viability and so motivates them to remain compliant. An executive 
from MILK explained that the involvement of the regulatory agency incentivizes milk suppliers 
to avoid product contamination: 
“The farmers know their requirements and I've never seen a load that has been refused 
for antibiotics or something because the farmers know better because they know it will 
have a very significant impact on [them]. So, the farmers expect very high level of quality 
so they don't take risk at that because it is their family business.” 
Case Group 1 firms also outsource information acquisition on supplier processes to the external 
stakeholders. As one of the owners of AEROSPACE explains: 
“I could tell you that if the company is approved [by the external stakeholder], I don't 
even need to think about them. I know that their process will be in place there. I will gain 
nothing by going for an audit.” 
Specifically, for MILK and PROSCUITTO, representatives of the external stakeholder have ac-
cess to suppliers’ production facilities and oversee supplier processes on an ongoing basis. The 
President of PROSCUITTO explained the importance of having stakeholder representatives at 
suppliers’ facilities: 
“They [stay in production facilities] enough so you cannot allude them forever... They 
come enough, the smart ones ask the right questions... Believe it or not, inspectors will 
come and ask something, observe something downstairs, ask one of the workers, will 
come up... and ask [a manager] the same question. And then compare stories. They are 
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almost like the police, they have badges, and if they want they can go in any established 
place of business or anywhere that they think has ties to good safety. They show their 
badge and they can go in. You cannot stop them, they are federal agents”. 
In contrast, in AEROSPACE the stakeholder representatives monitor suppliers’ facilities period-
ically, either once a year or every three years. Therefore, in this case the firm faces a threat of 
supplier processes containing potential triggers of non-compliance. This firm differs from the 
firms in the other two cases in its much closer relational ties with its suppliers. The focus on 
close relationships complements the efforts the stakeholder takes to ensure supplier compliance. 
Case Group 1 firms do not directly acquire information on supplier processes and thus have 
no means to mitigate the likelihood of non-compliance. They instead acquire information at the 
supply-base level by being aware of the stakeholders’ requirements, which represent a threshold 
to avoid supplier risks. When asked about potential supplier non-compliance, one of executives 
in AEROSPACE referred to stakeholder requirements guiding supplier processes: 
“If [suppliers] have a product that is discrepant and non-conforming, it must physically 
be destroyed. No chance… There are requirements you must destroy it.” 
Overall, the involvement of external stakeholders allows Case Group 1 firms to avoid supplier 
risks. Nevertheless, by outsourcing the monitoring of supplier compliance to external stakehold-
ers, these firms depend on the suppliers adhering to these process requirements each time they 
fulfill an order. 
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Case Group 2: Relationship enabled risk avoidance 
This group consists of DESK.R, HARDWOOD.R and PIPING-PARTS.R. Firms in this group 
build close relationships with their supply bases that consist of suppliers proven to be reliable 
and trustworthy. That is, these suppliers have high production capabilities and are motivated to 
comply. Case Group 2 suppliers strive to protect their reputation of being reliable, as expressed 
by the Chief Operating Officer of PIPING-PARTS.R, 
We rely on their reliance to quality, that quality is key to their reputation, for our own 
peace of mind with them... We don't [monitor them] because these guys are much better 
at keeping us [with] the updates... we do trust more than the other mills that they are en-
suring that things are going well… Really, it is a bit of a different corporate culture and 
yeah... I would chuck that up to be the biggest reason… They just take us seriously; they 
take their product seriously. 
The goals of the firms in Case Group 2 are aligned with the goals of these suppliers to ensure 
compliance. If the suppliers fail to comply, they are expected to suffer substantial reputational 
and financial losses. The supply bases of Case Group 2 are all located in North America, alt-
hough DESK.R not only sources locally but also from some offshore suppliers for certain mate-
rials/components unavailable locally. These firms thus share similar institutional environment 
with their suppliers.  
This Group includes cases with both high and low impact supplier risks, although all firms in 
this group believe that the processes of their suppliers contain few if any possible risk triggers. 
These firms provide incentives for their suppliers to remain compliant and foster long-term rela-
tionship with suppliers. DESK.R, the only large firm in this group, takes an additional step to 
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ensure relationship continuity by investing significant resources in supplier education, which 
helps the suppliers conform to increasing industry requirements. One of its executive managers 
explains, 
In very simplistic terms kind of the rules of engagement that if we’re going to partner, 
and I like partners, I don’t want to be looking for new suppliers. As an organization, 
we’re very loyal to our supplier base. We don’t change suppliers for a nickel. Some of 
our suppliers have been literally here since day one, 30 years. 
Another of its executive noted: 
I think [some of our competitors] learnt the hard lesson where they kind of beat the crap 
out of their suppliers: beat on their price, beat on everything else and they went through 
this whole thing where there’s no supply chain... You can’t take that approach. You got to 
work with them. It’s long-term. Short-term fine we’ll improve our margins, but 5 years, 
10 years down the road we’re onto another supplier, because he’s out of business…So 
let’s work together, their engineers work with your engineers. We engage them early in 
the process... 
Furthermore, DESK.R and PIPING-PARTS.R do not put significant cost pressures on their 
suppliers, while HARDWOOD.R relies on trust when it comes to cost negotiations. The firm, a 
hardwood manufacturer, grades incoming wood from its suppliers (because suppliers lack exper-
tise in wood grading) and these suppliers trust that the grading is done objectively and the cost is 
appropriately set. The firm’s owner emphasized the importance of approaching relationships in 
this manner: 
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When [a supplier] ships us they know we will pay for everything and we will have to de-
termine the grade. And hopefully they have confidence in us that we grade it properly. 
They just cut the wood and ship it. Their wood is very good. Their quality is very good. 
And they are very good people to deal with... These people are a pleasure to deal with... 
Both DESK.R and HARDWOOD.R also emphasized the importance of personal relationships 
between the members of their sourcing teams and their suppliers’ employees. They highlight the 
importance of informal meetings that encourage closer relationships with the suppliers. For in-
stance, the supply chain director of DESK.R describes: 
[For our primary members that have performed very well] I’ll pop to say thanks for eve-
rything…I was in Cambridge [, ON] this week with a supplier and there’s one operator 
at this facility who is notorious for giving us good product. [For instance,] she’d come in 
when she’s sick. I won’t get into a long story but I wanted to meet her personally. Her 
name is Anna and she’s a line operator at this [facility]... I wanted to personally meet her 
and thank her for everything. 
HARDWOOD.R managers prefer not to source from suppliers when they cannot establish per-
sonal relationships with their salesforce: 
You got some guys that are just, they just don’t click with us. They don’t like us, we don’t 
like them. Just personality. 
Moreover, if a supplier’s salesforce changes, the firm’s managers take steps to rebuild personal 
relationships with the new salesforce: 
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I had known this guy for years and I got to meet him and really I probably get a lot of 
their production because of him. If he was to leave or [his company] get bought [with] 
the new guy I couldn’t have bought [from]. So, yeah, the real importance is who[m] you 
are involved with. That’s why generally when we lose someone... you really have got to 
reconnect … once someone new takes over you’re starting over. You pretty much have 
got to rebuild. 
Overall, the firms in Case Group 2 gain confidence over time that their suppliers possess high 
production capabilities. In addition, the firms take steps to ensure that their suppliers are moti-
vated to comply. They trust that strong relational ties help them avoid non-compliance each time 
a supplier fulfills an order. 
Case Group 3: Risk mitigation  
This group consists of DESK.UN, HARDWOOD.UN and PIPING-PARTS.UN. These cases 
cover the same firms as Case Group 2 buying the same type of inputs. But the supply bases are 
managed differently because they consist of suppliers that the firms believe lack production ca-
pabilities and/or incentives to comply with order requirements on a consistent basis. Consequent-
ly, Case Group 3 firms believe that these suppliers have a high likelihood of non-compliance and 
do not trust that they can eliminate potential triggers of non-compliance in their processes. These 
firms do not rely on relational governance for their unreliable supply bases, but instead engage in 
behavior-based contractual governance and monitor supplier processes to ensure compliance. 
This governance mechanism then allows the firms to mitigate the supplier risks. Interestingly, 
this group includes cases with supplier risks of both high and low impact. 
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These three firms apply the following principle to supplier risks in these supply bases: They 
seek to have information on supplier processes to identify potential triggers of supplier risks be-
fore the risks materialize. Nevertheless, these firms somewhat differ in how they monitor suppli-
er processes. DESK.UN procures raw materials from suppliers that struggle to comply with in-
creasing industry requirements. These suppliers are motivated to comply, but they lack capabili-
ties. The firm assigns its engineers to oversee the suppliers’ production processes. The firm’s in-
tention is to educate the suppliers enough to decrease control over time. In contrast, PIPING-
PARTS.UN’s suppliers lack both production capabilities and incentives to comply. As a result, 
the firm does not foresee a way to build trust-based relationships and acknowledges that it needs 
to constantly keep the same level of control over its suppliers. The firm’s COO explained:  
I mean I trust them with our people on the ground… Obviously, it is a sliding scale de-
pending on suppliers. Some of them yeah I would but in any regard, it really would only 
be a matter of time till I did not trust all the mills if our inspection team was not there. 
DESK.UN and PIPING PARTS.UN do not put significant cost pressures on the suppliers to fur-
ther reduce the odds of non-compliance. They clarify their requirements by engaging in regular 
communications, where they explain how the suppliers’ processes conform to their requirements. 
HARDWOOD.UN, on the other hand, has been forced to source from suppliers that have caused 
previous supply disruptions by supplying wood of inferior quality or delaying shipments. These 
suppliers lack the motivation to comply with the firm’s requirements, as their viability does not 
depend on doing business with it. To monitor their processes, HARDWOOD.UN employs a per-
son who specifically oversees supplier compliance. This employee has significant experience in 
the industry and is located in close proximity to the suppliers’ facilities to control how they ful-
filled orders.  
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Overall, the firms in Case Group 3 engage in behavior-based contractual governance and ac-
quire comprehensive information on supplier processes to ensure compliance from these supply 
bases. These firms assign employees who directly oversee supplier compliance and thus ensure 
they have the ability to identify the presence of possible triggers of supplier risks and mitigate 
the risks before they materialize. They make this process less resource-intensive by selecting ei-
ther local suppliers or suppliers located in close proximity to each other. These firms also strive 
to retain the same suppliers because it helps to gain a better understanding of their processes.  
Case Group 4: Risk tolerance 
This last group consists of AUTO-PARTS and AUTOMATION. It differs from the rest of the 
sample because firms in this group tolerate supplier non-compliance to a certain extent. The 
firms face the risk of a supplier failing to produce products of acceptable quality, a non-
compliance that is considered to have low impact on these firms. The suppliers do have the po-
tential to comply, but may be unable to consistently supply products of acceptable quality. Both 
firms engage in outcome-based supplier governance and prioritize cost minimization in pro-
curement and, in particular, when they select suppliers. They also tend to interact closely with 
the suppliers only during their selection process, where the main selection criterion is whether 
the supplier can maintain product quality at an acceptable level. Once the suppliers have been 
selected, Case Group 4 firms address supplier risks only when they materialize; that is, when 
product quality has significantly deteriorated. For instance, AUTO-PARTS uses consumer feed-
back and product returns to identify non-compliant suppliers.  
AUTOMATION favors selecting component suppliers that offer products of acceptable quali-
ty at the lowest cost. If a supplier’s performance significantly deteriorates, the firm’s representa-
tive visits the supplier and if no successful corrective action takes place, then the firm stops 
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sourcing from that supplier. Similarly, AUTO-PARTS focuses on selecting suppliers that can 
offer acceptable level of product quality at the lowest cost. It has developed standards for as-
sessing a supplier’s production system and ability to achieve the required level of quality. The 
firm’s quality team does so under significant time pressure: 
It has to be very quick. Our decision-making sometimes could be between a month or 
two. 
Once suppliers are selected, the firm rates them based on defect costs every month and identifies 
the suppliers that require intervention. Its management admits that when procuring small vol-
umes from a non-compliant supplier, the non-compliance may go unnoticed due to small associ-
ated costs.  
Although AUTO-PARTS and AUTOMATION attempt to limit the likelihood of supplier risk, 
the likelihood remains high. They do expect that product quality can deteriorate if some of the 
suppliers fail to comply with their quality requirements. This is one of the reasons why both 
firms emphasize the importance of offering a warranty to their customers. For instance, in AU-
TOMATION case the firm’s manager explained: 
[We] are open for any communication or any concerns that the customer might have if it 
gets out of spec or so on and so forth. Or if there is something that’s not functioning to 
how they would like it to be then we are still there. But we normally give out if I’m not 
mistaken one year warranty in terms of what we have built. 
These firms also have a number of practices in common. They put considerable cost pressure 
on their suppliers and, to limit the likelihood of supplier risks, they regularly monitor the suppli-
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ers’ performance and communicate with suppliers that fail to meet product quality requirements. 
They also do have stable supply bases. AUTOMATION manufactures engineer-to-order equip-
ment and selects new suppliers for each new project. As one of its executive explained when dis-
cussing particular equipment that they engineered: 
So, if we look at [supply base for this product] ... we try to, you can go to anyone, we 
have pretty much an open mind here. You can go to whomever you want…   
AUTO-PARTS’ large supply base limits its ability to invest in supplier relationships. As a mem-
ber of the firm’s quality team noted: 
But I hope you realize that we have thousands of different products... It is a very complex 
system to be able to make improvements. 
Overall, the firms in Case Group 4 choose not to acquire information on supplier processes; 
instead, they acquire information about potential supplier risks at the firm level.  After providing 
the suppliers with their compliance requirements during the selection process, they learn about 
the suppliers’ potential to meet these requirements. Case Group 4 firms are aware of the supplier 
risks they face and choose to address them by having certain tolerance for supplier non-
compliance. They do not have the means to mitigate the likelihood of non-compliance and are 
prepared to face supplier failures. 
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Case study results 
Ways to address supplier risk  
The literature on supplier risk management points out that firms can mitigate supplier risks if 
they monitor supplier processes and identify potential risk triggers in a timely manner (e.g., 
Finch et al., 2004; Christopher and Lee, 2004; Marucheck et al., 2011; Sodhi et al., 2012). That 
is, the literature agrees that comprehensive information on supplier processes is necessary to mit-
igate supplier risks before they materialize. Initially, the aim of collecting case study data was to 
understand how various firms acquire this information. The results of the collected case studies, 
however, reveal that many firms choose not to have comprehensive information on supplier pro-
cesses, despite the recommendations of the supplier risk management literature. Specifically, 
firms seek to gain an ability to mitigate supplier risks only when they do not have alternative ap-
proaches to address the risks.  
The firms in two case groups believe that they avoid supplier risks owing to their governance 
mechanism. In Case Group 1 the firms avoid supplier risks because a powerful external stake-
holder regulates and controls their suppliers. Case Group 1 firms engage in behavior-based gov-
ernance enabled by a powerful external stakeholder. These firms choose to rely on behavior-
based governance because the stakeholders, and not these firms, control behavior of their suppli-
ers. Specifically, they outsource the burden of acquiring comprehensive information on supplier 
processes and identifying possible triggers of non-compliance to these stakeholders.  
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Figure 4. Paths determining firm’s approach to supplier risk 
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Case Group 2 firms do not collect comprehensive information on suppliers because they be-
lieve that they can avoid non-compliance via close relational ties with their suppliers. These 
firms are convinced that relational ties provide sufficient behavioral control to ensure supplier 
compliance. In other words, they rely on relational governance to foster stable relationships with 
their suppliers and trust that the suppliers are motivated to remain compliant. 
P1. A firm does not seek to have the capability to mitigate supplier non-compliance 
when it believes its governance mechanism allows it to avoid this risk. 
Two criteria determine whether firms seek to acquire comprehensive information on supplier 
processes to mitigate the supplier risks. The first criterion is whether suppliers have capabilities 
sufficient to comply with the firms’ requirements. The second criterion is whether suppliers 
share impact of the risks with the firms. If suppliers fail to meet either of these criteria they are 
associated with high-likelihood supplier risk. Then, unless the firms are willing to tolerate sup-
plier risks, they seek to acquire comprehensive information on supplier processes to mitigate the 
risk of supplier non-compliance. 
The first criterion, supplier capabilities, plays an important role in firms’ decision-making be-
cause suppliers that lack capabilities are likely to have risk triggers present in their daily opera-
tions. As a result, the firms need to invest resources into acquiring information on supplier pro-
cesses and have an ability to mitigate supplier risks. If the firms fail to do so, they are likely to be 
affected by materialized supplier risks on a regular basis. 
The literature argues that sharing with suppliers potential impact to supplier risks tends to lead 
to a greater level of information sharing between firms and their suppliers (e.g., Harland et al., 
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2003; Jüttner, 2005; Ritchie & Brindley, 2007). The results of the case studies, however, indicate 
that when firms source from suppliers that share the impact of materialized risks they are less 
likely to have comprehensive information on supplier processes. Instead, the firms are convinced 
that their suppliers are motivated to eliminate potential triggers of supplier risks. While agency 
theory (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989A; Whipple and Roh, 2010) emphasizes the importance of aligning 
goals of the principal (i.e., a focal firm) and the agent (i.e., a supplier), the case results show how 
potential impact of supplier non-compliance contributes to the goal alignment. Specifically, the 
sampled firms believe that suppliers that will suffer from their own non-compliances have goals 
aligned with the firms’. In contrast, firms that source from suppliers that are not affected by their 
non-compliances seek to mitigate the likelihood of non-compliance by acquiring information on 
supplier processes - or tolerate supplier non-compliances on a regular basis. 
P2. Sourcing from suppliers that lack capabilities necessitates a firm to seek compre-
hensive information on potential triggers of supplier non-compliance - or tolerate the 
risk. 
P3. Sourcing from suppliers that do not share the impact of materialized supplier risk 
necessitates a firm to seek comprehensive information on potential triggers of suppli-
er non-compliance - or tolerate the risk. 
Relying on external stakeholders to avoid supplier non-compliance 
The firms from industries, in which a powerful external stakeholder regulate suppliers, choose 
not to acquire comprehensive information on supplier processes and do not have direct means to 
mitigate the likelihood of supplier non-compliance. Instead, they outsource the efforts of elimi-
nating potential triggers of supplier non-compliance to the involved stakeholder. That is, these 
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firms engage in behavior-based contractual governance enabled by the stakeholder involvement 
and believe that this governance mechanism allows them to avoid supplier non-compliance. 
These firms are convinced that the requirements the stakeholders impose on supplier process-
es are sufficient to ensure supplier compliance. They also know what behavioral control 
measures the stakeholders take to ensure that the suppliers adhere to these requirements. As a 
result, the firms believe that their suppliers have the required processes in place and can success-
fully comply with their order requirements.  
The literature has predicted that external stakeholders would play a more important role in 
coordinating firms’ supply bases than in the past (e.g., Bitran et al., 2007). The results show that 
the stakeholder involvement can go beyond coordination, affecting many aspects of supplier op-
erations. First, in the three collected cases the stakeholders are involved in supplier selection pro-
cess. As Marucheck et al. (2011) point out, firms need to find a way to incorporate factors asso-
ciated with managing risks into supplier selection decisions. Interestingly, for these firms it is the 
external stakeholders - and not the firms - that ensure that selected suppliers can eliminate poten-
tial triggers of non-compliance in their processes.  
The supplier governance literature argues that behavior-based contractual governance requires 
having comprehensive information on supplier processes (e.g., Whipple and Roh, 2010; Sel-
viaridis and Norrman, 2014). However, the results of the case studies reveal that the firms en-
gaged in behavior-based governance may not seek the comprehensive information if a powerful 
external stakeholder regulates and controls their supply base. Specifically, the firms believe that 
they do not need to know how their suppliers fulfill their orders because the involved stakeholder 
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has developed strict requirements for supplier processes and oversees that the suppliers adhere to 
these requirements.  
Finally, these stakeholders help align the goals of suppliers with those of the firms (Eisen-
hardt, 1989A; Whipple and Roh, 2010) by motivating suppliers to remain compliant. Specifical-
ly, the survival of suppliers, in these cases, to a great extent depends on their ability to conform 
to the requirements imposed by the stakeholders. Non-conforming suppliers can lose their li-
cense to operate and therefore severe relationships with all of their customers.  
P4. When a powerful external stakeholder regulates a firm’s suppliers, the firm does 
not seek comprehensive information on potential triggers of supplier non-
compliance. 
P5. When a powerful external stakeholder regulates a firm’s suppliers, the firm out-
sources the efforts of monitoring supplier processes to this stakeholder. 
P6. When a powerful external stakeholder regulates a firm’s suppliers, the firm be-
lieves its suppliers have external incentives to remain compliant. 
Using relationship to avoid supplier non-compliance 
The case results also bring to light the role buyer-supplier relationships play in managing 
risks, following Marucheck et al.’s (2011) call for a better understanding of this role. Scholars 
(e.g., Harland et al., 2003; Villena et al., 2011) warn against relying on relationships to manage 
supplier risks, indicating that from the perspective of risk management, “trust is a risky engage-
ment” (Harland et al., 2003: 55). Nevertheless, three sampled firms use relational governance to 
manage supplier risks. They foster close relational ties with suppliers that have high production 
capabilities and share the potential impact of materialized risks. These firms believe that their 
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suppliers value the relationships and hence are incentivized to eliminate potential triggers of non-
compliance.  
Furthermore, the supply chain management literature often highlights a higher degree of in-
formation sharing among supply chain partners with close relational ties (e.g., Richie and Brind-
ley, 2007). The cases show a different aspect of this approach to buyer-supplier relationships: by 
building close relational ties with their suppliers, the firms do not seek access to comprehensive 
information on supplier processes. Instead, they solely rely on the firm-level information: they 
believe that their suppliers value the relationships with them and are motivated to eliminate po-
tential triggers of supplier risks.  
P7. When a firm has close relational ties with its suppliers, the firm does not seek 
comprehensive information on potential triggers of supplier non-compliance. 
Interestingly, the three firms in this study that rely on relational governance bifurcate their 
supply bases. They prefer this governance mechanism, but rely on it only with suppliers with 
which they have established close, trust-based relationships. When a supplier’s behavior indi-
cates that it either lacks production capabilities or is not motivated to comply with the imposed 
requirements, the firms instead use behavior-based contractual governance and strive to have 
comprehensive information on supplier processes. 
P8. A firm that prefers using relational governance will revert to behavior-based con-
tractual governance when it believes that a supplier either lacks capabilities or does 
not share the impact of materialized supplier risk.  
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Stable relationships with unreliable suppliers 
The supplier governance literature emphasizes that effective relational governance depends on 
having stable supply bases and sharing accrued benefits with suppliers over time (Poppo and 
Zenger, 2002; Jiang, 2009; Nyaga et al., 2010). These practices foster relationships and help to 
ensure supplier compliance. In contrast, firms relying on behavior-based contractual governance 
do not depend on these practices as they ensure supplier compliance by acquiring comprehensive 
information on supplier processes.  
Interestingly, the results of the case studies show that firms that rely on behavior-based con-
tractual governance have stable supply bases and do not put cost pressures on their suppliers. 
Their suppliers either lack production capabilities and/or do not share the impact of materialized 
supplier risks. For that reason, the firms cannot establish close, trust-based relationships with 
them. And yet, they rely on relational practices and choose not to view the relationships with the-
se unreliable suppliers as purely transactional.  
The literature has emphasized the value of complementing contractual governance with cer-
tain aspects of relational governance (e.g., Poppo and Zenger, 2002). The case results add to this 
discussion by showing why doing so can be valuable in the context of supplier risk management. 
Specifically, firms relying on behavior-based contractual governance believe that certain rela-
tional practices, including having stable supply bases and limiting cost pressures on their suppli-
ers, can help them further mitigate the likelihood of supplier non-compliance.  
P9. A firm relying on behavior-based contractual governance seeks to have a stable 
supply base to help further mitigate the likelihood of supplier non-compliance. 
P10. A firm relying on behavior-based contractual governance limits cost pressures 
on its suppliers to help further mitigate the likelihood of supplier non-compliance. 
 65 
Limitations of outcome-based governance in supplier risk management 
The results of the case studies also reveal the limitations of outcome-based contractual govern-
ance in managing supplier risks. Firms relying on this governance mechanism assess and reward 
suppliers based on the outcomes suppliers achieve (Eisenhardt, 1989A; Whipple and Roh, 2010). 
As a result, outcome-based contractual governance shifts the responsibility of identifying poten-
tial risk triggers from the firms onto suppliers. The case results show that only firms facing low-
impact supplier risks choose to rely on this governance mechanism. 
The cases demonstrate that outcome-based governance is ineffective if a firm’s goal is to en-
sure supplier compliance on a regular basis. If a supplier fails to achieve a required outcome, - 
i.e. it causes a non-compliance – such situation represents a materialized supplier risk. Therefore, 
firms engaging in outcome-based governance have to tolerate supplier risks.  
P11. A firm relying on outcome-based contractual governance is required to tolerate 
potential impact of supplier non-compliance. 
P12. A firm chooses to rely on outcome-based contractual governance when a sup-
pler non-compliance has low impact on the firm. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: AGENT-BASED SIMULATION  
The cases provided important insights into how in practice firms manage the risk of supplier 
non-compliance. Specifically, they show four distinct approaches firms may take to manage the 
risk of supplier non-compliance. Yet, these descriptive results do not reveal which of these four 
approaches a firm should choose to successfully manage the risk of supplier non-compliance. To 
offer prescriptive results, I complement the case studies with an agent-based simulation. The 
agent-based simulation derives its assumptions from the results of case studies. Its aim is to in-
vestigate a firm’s decision-making over time and explore what decisions a firm should make to 
reduce the likelihood of supplier non-compliance.  
Simulation is a theory building methodology found useful in studying emergent phenomena 
(Davis et al., 2007; Fioretti, 2013). Scholars have used simulations to explore diverse manage-
ment topics ranging from innovation diffusion to teamwork to organizational learning (Crowder 
et al., 2012; Davis, et al., 2007; Miller and Lin, 2010; Rahmandad and Sterman, 2008). Many 
have argued for a more extensive use of simulations in supply chain management research (e.g., 
Gilbert, 2008; Macal and North, 2005; Van Der Zee and Van Der Vorst, 2005). 
In this research, I employed agent-based modeling (Wilensky and Ran, 2015). It is a widely-
used approach when the phenomenon under study involves a “collection of autonomous deci-
sion-making entities, agents” (Bonabeau, 2002: 7280) such as buyers and suppliers. Agent-based 
modeling is a bottom-up approach, where agents’ rules of behavior are specified to understand 
the dynamics of an entire system (e.g., a firm’s supply base) (Macal and North, 2005), and where 
agents (e.g., a firm and its suppliers) can possess heterogeneous attributes, uncertain behavior, 
form networks, and their interactions influence their actions (Bonabeau, 2002; Fioretti, 2013).  
 67 
Application of agent-based modeling in the context of supply chain management - and espe-
cially in the context of supplier risk management - is relatively novel. For that reason, the agent-
based simulation in this research is not based on any existing simulation models of supply 
chains. Instead, it is based on a number of agent-based models from biology and sociology that 
focus on agent behavior in networks (Wilensky and Ran, 2015). I programmed the simulation in 
NetLogo, currently the most popular programming environment for agent-based modeling simu-
lations. NetLogo is open-source software with extensive supporting materials available to assist 
with developing simulations for a particular context (Railsback and Grimm, 2011; Wilensky and 
Rand, 2015).  
A simulation should well mimic the real world, and yet it cannot represent all its aspects in 
equal degree of detail (Wilensky and Rand, 2015). As Bonabeau (2002: 7287) states, “a model 
has to serve a purpose; a general-purpose model cannot work”. Fioretti (2013) notes that a 
study’s research question can give a focus to a simulation determining what aspects of the real 
world the simulation should model in detail and what aspects it should omit. Davis et al. (2007) 
argue that a simulation then requires sufficient theoretical understanding of the studied phenom-
enon. Only then can a researcher ensure that the simulation’s representation of the phenomenon 
is valid. 
In the absence of quantitative data that describe relevant agent and system behaviors, scholars 
recommend relying on qualitative empirical methods such as case studies (Hughes et al., 2012; 
Macal and North, 2005). As Midgley et al. (2007:887) point out, empirically grounded simula-
tions tend to be “realistic, at least to some degree of face validity, and … evidently complex in 
overall structure”. Following their recommendation, I use the results of the case studies to 
ground the simulation assumptions.  
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Model verification is another crucial step that ensures that the conceptual model has been cor-
rectly represented in the programming code (Midgley et al., 2007). It establishes “an understand-
ing for the cause of unexpected outcomes and exploring the impact of small changes in rules.” 
(Wilensky and Rand, 2015: 324-325). In essence, model verification is a debugging of the simu-
lation code. I relied on a number of techniques to verify the simulation model (Midgley et al., 
2007; Wilensky and Rand, 2015). First, a researcher not involved in model coding inspected the 
programming code. Second, I depicted the simulation algorithm in a number of flow charts. The-
se charts provide an intuitive way to analyze the underlying conceptual model. Third, I per-
formed sensitivity analysis to examine how changes in model parameters affect its results and 
therefore established the robustness of the simulation results. The code of the simulation is avail-
able in Appendix D. 
Simulation description 
This agent-based simulation investigates the behavior of a firm attempting to manage the risk 
of supplier non-compliance. The case studies show that firms can take different approaches to 
manage their supplier risks. The simulation then explores how a particular approach to supplier 
risks impacts the likelihood of supplier non-compliance. The case firms only managed supplier 
risks associated with their first-tier suppliers. Therefore, the simulation uses a single-tier supply 
network consisting of two agent types, a focal firm and its suppliers, with each agent being de-
scribed by two parameters: capability ! ∈ [0,1] and risk impact ( ∈ [0,1]. Capability !  is de-
fined as an ability to employ internal and external resources to facilitate supply management pro-
cesses (Wu et al., 2006). Capability ! thus determines both the extent to which the focal firm is 
able to successfully manage its suppliers and the extent to which these suppliers are able to com-
ply with the focal firm’s order requirements. Risk impact ( is defined as the potential of supplier 
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non-compliance to inflict long-term damage to the buyer or supplier. Risk impact ( determines 
the extent to which the focal firm is motivated to ensure supplier compliance and the extent to 
which these suppliers are motivated to comply with the focal firm’s order requirements. Various 
external conditions such as competitive pressures, change of ownership and the emergence of 
new technologies can lead to fluctuations in ! and (. Therefore, at the end of each time period, 
and for any agent, the simulation also incorporates a 5% probability for ! and ( to increase or 
decrease by a set value of 0.01. The simulation notation is shown in Table 5. 
Parameter Notation Definition 
Focal firm’s capability !) The focal firm’s ability to ensure supplier compliance 
Focal firm’s risk impact () Potential damage inflicted to the focal firm by supplier non-compliance  
Focal firm’s selection standard *+ Threshold for a supplier’s capability the focal firm uses during suppli-er selection 
A supplier’s capability !, A supplier’s ability to comply with the focal firm’s requirements 
A supplier’s risk impact (, Potential damage inflicted to a supplier by its non-compliance 
An external stakeholder’s capability !- A stakeholder’s ability to regulate and control the focal firm’s suppli-ers 
A supplier’s risk impact imposed by an 
external stakeholder (- The external stakeholder’s potential to inflict damage to a supplier that caused a non-compliance 
A supplier’s likelihood of non-
compliance ./0,  The likelihood of non-compliance associated with a supplier 1 
Highest likelihood of non-compliance .2345  The likelihood of non-compliance associated with a supplier that rep-resents the greatest threat to the focal firm 
Table 5. Simulation notation 
Figure 5 depicts the algorithm of the simulation. The simulation unfolds as follows: At time 6 = 0 a focal firm selects its suppliers and for each subsequent period 6 = 1,2,3… (correspond-
ing to a month), each supplier produces and sends its products to that firm, with a likelihood ./0,  
that any given supplier 1 fails to comply with the order requirements. The supplier’s capability !,  and risk impact (,  determine this likelihood of non-compliance. I use the functional form ./0, = ; 1 − !,(, , where ; is a scaling parameter (; = 0.1 without loss of generality), to cap-
ture an interaction between !, and (,. In other words, low levels on either a supplier’s capability 
or its risk impact can significantly increase the likelihood of non-compliance. When a non-
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compliance actually takes place, it can undermine the focal firm’s product quality, lead to signif-
icant financial losses or harm that firm’s reputation. I thus focus on accounting for the supplier s, 
among a total of ? suppliers, that represents the greatest threat to the focal firm @ and record as 
simulation outcome the highest likelihood of non-compliance in the firm’s supply base, .234) =A;B,∈{D,E,../}(./0, ).  
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Figure 5. Flowchart of simulation algorithm 
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As the cases reveal, during the supplier selection process, the focal firm acquires crucial in-
formation regarding the likelihood of these suppliers to remain compliant. That information de-
pends on the focal firm’s approach to governing supplier risks. Regardless of the selected ap-
proach, the focal firm will attempt to select suppliers with a capability sufficient to comply with 
its order requirements. Consequently, the focal firm tries to select suitable suppliers with a capa-
bility !, that is equal to or exceeds certain selection standards *+ (i.e., !, ≥ *+). Because a sub-
set of selected suppliers may fail to satisfy this selection criteria (Eisenhardt, 1989A; Whipple 
and Roh, 2010), the simulation incorporates a probability of selecting a suitable supplier that de-
pends on the focal firm’s own capability !)  and its risk impact () . I use the functional form .(!, ≥ *+) = !)() to capture the fact that the probability of selecting a supplier that satisfies 
the focal firm’s selection criterion approaches zero when the focal firm itself possesses low ca-
pability or faces low risk impact from supplier non-compliance.  
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Figure 6. ‘Select suppliers’ sub-process 
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When a supplier triggers a non-compliance, the focal firm can either continue or terminate its 
relationship with that supplier. Terminating a relationship forces the focal firm to select a new 
supplier by following the same supplier selection process the firm relied on at 6 = 0. On the oth-
er hand, continuing a relationship with a non-compliant supplier may require a corrective action, 
because the focal firm may hope that the supplier improves its capability !, to a level that satis-
fies the selection criterion !, ≥ *+. Nevertheless, success is not guaranteed and the supplier’s 
current capability !,, its risk impact (, and the focal firm’s selection standard *+ determine the 
probability . of a successful corrective action. I use the functional form . = !, *+ (, to cap-
ture the following properties: the lower !, is relative to *+, or the lower (, is (and thus the less 
the supplier’s incentive to improve its capability), the less likely the corrective action will suc-
ceed. When the non-compliant supplier already possesses capability that satisfies the focal firm’s 
selection criterion, then no corrective action takes place. 
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Figure 7. ‘Non-compliant suppliers attempt corrective action’ sub-process 
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The four identified approaches to supplier risk management – risk mitigation, relationship-
enabled risk avoidance, stakeholder-enabled risk avoidance and risk tolerance – differ in terms 
of (1) how the focal firm selects its suppliers and (2) how it ensures supplier compliance. Table 6 
summarizes the differences. A firm engaged in risk mitigation strives to have comprehensive in-
formation about supplier processes every time it requests an order from a supplier. These firms 
select suppliers with capabilities that satisfy the selection criterion !, ≥ *+. At the same time, 
the firm accepts suppliers with any level of (, because its employees are present in suppliers’ 
facilities to assure supplier compliance. Furthermore, the simulation takes into account that not 
all firms can mitigate the risk of supplier non-compliance to the same degree. A firm’s ability 
and motivation to identify and remove potential triggers of supplier non-compliance increase as 
the impact of non-compliance and the firm’s supply management capability also increase. As a 
result, if the firm engages in risk mitigation the probability of non-compliance associated with 
supplier s depends on the supplier’s capability and risk impact and the firm’s capability and risk 
impact, ./0, = ; 1 − !,(, (1 − !5(5). 
A firm engaged in relationship-enabled risk avoidance believes its suppliers strive to comply 
owing to their mutual close relational ties. Hence, the focal firm believes that the selected suppli-
ers can be impacted by their non-compliance, which then incentivizes them to comply with the 
firm’s order requirements. In addition to selecting suppliers with capability that satisfies the se-
lection criterion !, ≥ *+, the focal firm then also selects suppliers that are impacted by their non-
compliances at least as much as the focal firm is. In other words, the focal firm considers a se-
cond selection criterion, (, ≥ (). Nevertheless, success is not guaranteed and the focal firm’s 
risk impact () determines the probability of selecting a supplier who will be impacted as much as 
the firm if non-compliance occurs. I use the functional form .((, ≥ ()) = O() (O = 1 without 
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loss of generality) to ensure that the greater the focal firm’s risk impact is, the greater its incen-
tive to select suppliers that also face high levels of risk impact. By satisfying both selection crite-
ria, the likelihood that any of the focal firm’s suppliers fails to comply decreases, since ./0, =; 1 − !,(,  approaches 0 as !, and (, increase. 
 Risk tolerance 
Relationship-
enabled  
risk avoidance 
Risk mitigation Stakeholder-enabled risk avoidance 
Supplier  
selection  
criteria 
!, ≥ *+ !, ≥ *+;  (, ≥ () !, ≥ *+ !, ≥ *+;  (, ≥ (- 
Likelihood of 
supplier non-
compliance 
./0, = ; 1 − !,(,  ./0, = ; 1 − !,(,  ./0, = ; 1 − !,(, (1 − !)()) ./0, = ; 1 − !,(, (1 − !-) 
Table 6. Four approaches to manage supplier risks 
A firm engaged in stakeholder-enabled risk avoidance believes that it does not face supplier 
risks because a powerful external stakeholder is controlling the suppliers. In addition to selecting 
suppliers with capability that satisfy the selection criterion !, ≥ *+, the focal firm selects from 
suppliers incentivized to comply by a powerful external stakeholder that sets a lower bound (- on 
their risk impact, (, ≥ (- . Not all suppliers are guaranteed to face such risk impact with the 
probability of selecting a supplier with the required risk impact expressed as .((, ≥ (-) = P(- 
(P = 1 without loss of generality). The greater the risk impact the stakeholder imposes on the 
suppliers, the more likely suppliers satisfy this selection criterion. Moreover, representatives of 
the stakeholder in the suppliers’ facilities can identify and remove potential triggers of non-
compliance. Consequently, a supplier’s likelihood of non-compliance, ./0, , depends not only on 
its capability !, and risk impact (,, but also on the capability of the stakeholder, !-. I therefore 
adjust the likelihood of non-compliance by using the functional form ./0, = ; 1 − !,(, (1 −!-), which captures a reduction in the likelihood of non-compliance owing to a more capable 
stakeholder controlling a firm’s suppliers. 
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A firm engaged in risk tolerance does not invest significant resources in supplier risk man-
agement accepting a certain exposure to supplier risks. During supplier selection, the firm focus-
es on selecting suppliers with sufficient capability level, !, ≥ *+ and accepts suppliers with any 
level of (,. Once suppliers are selected, the firm does not seek to have comprehensive infor-
mation about supplier processes. Instead, it manages supplier non-compliances only if they oc-
cur. As a result, the likelihood of non-compliance that its supplier 1 exhibits is determined by the 
supplier’s capability !, and its risk impact (,, ./0, = ; 1 − !,(, . 
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Simulation results 
The simulation was set to answer the following research question: what decisions should firms 
make to reduce the likelihood of supplier non-compliance? To answer this question, I first fo-
cused on the decision-making of a firm that has chosen a particular approach to managing sup-
plier risks. By doing so, I was able to explore in detail how simulation parameters influence the 
likelihood of supplier non-compliance a firm faces under each approach. The simulation results 
reveal that the parameters often interact, thus influencing the extent to which each parameter af-
fects the likelihood of non-compliance. Table 7 summarizes pairwise interactions of parameters 
under each approach to supplier risk management and shows how each parameter affects the 
likelihood of non-compliance. Below I focus on the most revealing results. 
  
 80 
 
Approach Firm reduces the likelihood of non-compliance if… 
Steeper likelihood of non-compliance reduction if  ... 
Reaction to  
non-compliance 
Firm’s 
capability 
Selection  
standard 
Supply  
chain size 
Stakeholder’s  
capability 
Stakeholder 
enabled 
risk  
avoidance 
 
Firm’s capability 
­   -   ­  ¯ ¯ 
Selection standard 
­  - ­    ¯ ¯ 
Supply chain size 
¯  - ­  ­    ¯ 
Stakeholder’s capability 
­  -  ¯ ¯   ­   
Relationship 
enabled  
risk  
avoidance 
Firm’s capability 
­ 
Terminate  
Relationship   ­ ¯  - 
Selection standard 
­ - ­   ¯  - 
Supply chain size 
¯ - ­ ­    -` 
Risk  
mitigation 
Firm’s capability 
­  -   ¯ ­  - 
Selection standard 
­ - ¯   -  - 
Supply chain size 
¯ - ¯ -    - 
Risk  
tolerance 
Firm’s capability 
­ 
Terminate  
Relationship    - ¯ - 
Selection standard 
­ - -   ¯  - 
Supply chain size 
­ 
Terminate  
Relationship ­ ­    - 
­ - increase, ¯ - decrease 
Table 7. Summary of simulation results 
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The effect of parameters under stakeholder enabled risk avoidance 
In many regulated industries, firms rely on a powerful external stakeholder to avoid supplier 
compliances. The simulation shows that under stakeholder enabled risk avoidance the likelihood 
of supplier non-compliance is largely determined by the stakeholder’s capability. As portrayed in 
Figure 8, when the stakeholder has high capability, the firm faces negligible likelihood of non-
compliance and thus avoids this risk. Furthermore, even if the firm lacks capability and uses low 
selection standards, the likelihood of non-compliance remains low. 
Alternatively, when the involved stakeholder has low capability, the firm should seek ways to 
complement the stakeholder’s insufficient efforts to reduce the likelihood of non-compliance. As 
Figure 8 shows, it should have stricter selection standards. In addition, the firm can reduce the 
likelihood of non-compliance by sourcing from fewer suppliers. That is, a firm with small supply 
base is less dependent on the stakeholder’s capability. The likely reason is that such a firm faces 
lower chance of overestimating ability of each of its suppliers to comply with its order require-
ments. These two decisions have greater effect on the likelihood as the stakeholder’s capability 
decreases. Finally, as expected, when the stakeholder lacks capability, a firm with high capability 
faces lower likelihood of non-compliance. However, even high-capability firms should have 
stricter selection standards and source from fewer suppliers.   
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Figure 8. The role of stakeholder’s capability in determining the likelihood of supplier non-
compliance under stakeholder enabled risk avoidance 
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Figure 9. The role of a firm’s supply base size in determining the likelihood of supplier non-
compliance under stakeholder enabled risk avoidance 
The simulation also reveals that under stakeholder enabled risk avoidance supply base size 
has an unexpected role in determining the likelihood of non-compliance. As portrayed in Figure 
9, if the involved stakeholder has high capability, a firm will only marginally increase the likeli-
hood of non-compliance if it chooses to increase the size of its supply base. In contrast, if the 
stakeholder lacks capability the effect of supply base size on the likelihood of non-compliance is 
non-linear, with the likelihood decreasing at an increasing rate as supply base size decreases.  
Conjecture 1. If the involved stakeholder lacks capability, then a firm engaged in 
stakeholder enabled risk avoidance should increase its selection standard to achieve 
a lower likelihood of non-compliance. 
Conjecture 2. If the involved stakeholder lacks capability, then a firm engaged in 
stakeholder enabled risk avoidance should have a small supply base to achieve a 
lower likelihood of non-compliance. 
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The effect of parameters under relationship enabled risk avoidance  
A firm engaged in relationship enabled risk avoidance believes that close relational ties with 
its suppliers motivate the suppliers to comply with its requirements. For that reason, such a firm 
deems it unnecessary to acquire comprehensive information on supplier processes to ensure 
compliance. The simulation shows that under relationship enabled risk avoidance the likelihood 
of non-compliance is highly sensitive to the size of the firm’s supply base. In fact, supply base 
size not only largely determines the likelihood of non-compliance, but it also moderates the ef-
fect of other parameters on the likelihood of non-compliance. First, the effect of supply base size 
on the likelihood of non-compliance is non-linear with the likelihood decreasing at an increasing 
rate as supply base size decreases (Figure 10). Second, increasing the firm’s selection standard 
leads to a greater reduction in the likelihood of non-compliance when a firm has a small supply 
base (Figure 10). In addition, a firm engaged in relationship enabled risk avoidance rarely bene-
fits from relationship continuity with suppliers that have caused non-compliances. In general, 
such a firm is better off terminating relationships with non-compliant suppliers, especially if it 
has a strict selection standard (Figure 10). Finally, supply base size determines the extent to 
which a firm’s capability affects the likelihood of non-compliance (Figure 11). Only if a firm has 
a small supply base, does improving its capability linearly decreases the likelihood of non-
compliance. In contrast, if a firm has a large supply base, then improving its capability will sub-
stantially decrease the likelihood only after a certain threshold. As a result, if a firm with average 
capability chooses to have large supply base, it will face a likelihood of non-compliance similar 
to that faced by a low-capability firm.  
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Figure 10. The role of a firm’s supply base size in determining the likelihood of supplier non-
compliance under relationship enabled risk avoidance 
 
Figure 11. The role of a firm’s capability in determining the likelihood of supplier non-
compliance under relationship enabled risk avoidance in small and large supply bases 
Overall, one of the key decisions for a firm engaged in relationship enabled risk avoidance is 
to have a small supply base, since sourcing from a limited number of suppliers offers a firm more 
opportunities to decrease the likelihood of supplier non-compliance. While unexpected, the ef-
fect of supply base size has an intuitive explanation: these firms choose not to seek comprehen-
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sive information on supplier processes and trust that their suppliers have both the potential and 
the motivation to remain compliant. The more suppliers such a firm procures from, the more 
likely it is to overestimate the potential of its suppliers to comply.  
Conjecture 3. A firm engaged in relationship enabled risk avoidance should have a 
small supply base to achieve a lower likelihood of non-compliance. 
Conjecture 4. A firm engaged in relationship enabled risk avoidance that has a small 
supply base can further decrease the likelihood of non-compliance by  
(a) terminating relationships with a supplier that has caused a non-compliance; or 
(b) having greater capability; or 
(c) increasing its selection standard. 
Conjecture 5. A firm engaged in relationship enabled risk avoidance that has a large 
supply base faces a capability threshold below which lower capability levels are no 
longer associated with a higher likelihood of non-compliance.  
The effect of parameters under risk mitigation 
A firm that seeks to have comprehensive information on supplier processes to engage in risk 
mitigation chooses this approach to manage supplier risks because it believes that supplier pro-
cesses contain triggers of potential supplier non-compliances. Such a firm then seeks to utilize its 
internal resources to identify and remove these risk triggers. The simulation shows that the extent 
to which this firm is able to mitigate the risk of supplier non-compliance largely depends on its 
capability (Figure 12). In addition, a firm’s capability determines whether the firm’s decisions on 
its selection standard and supply base size affect the likelihood of non-compliance. For high-
capability focal firms, the impact of the selection standard (i.e., minimum level of capability *+ 
for each selected supplier) on their likelihood of supplier non-compliance is relatively small 
(Figure 12). Firms with low-to-average supply chain capabilities can decrease the likelihood of 
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non-compliance by increasing the supplier selection standard but only if they have small supply 
bases. The limited role of selection standard shows that in general firms engaged in risk mitiga-
tion do not require sourcing from reliable suppliers to decrease the likelihood of non-compliance. 
Finally, as Figure 13 shows, the size of a firm’s supply base affects the likelihood of non-
compliance only for firms with low-to-average capabilities. The non-linear effect of supply base 
size on the likelihood of non-compliance observed under other approaches to supplier risks is 
present only at lower firm’s capability levels under risk mitigation. When a firm has a high capa-
bility, it will face only a marginally higher likelihood of non-compliance if it chooses to increase 
the size of its supply base. 
 
Figure 12. The role of a firm’s capability and its selection standard in determining the likelihood 
of supplier non-compliance under risk mitigation in small and large supply bases 
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Figure 13. The role of a firm’s supply base size in determining the likelihood of supplier non-
compliance under risk mitigation 
Overall, under risk mitigation the likelihood of supplier non-compliance is to a great extent 
determined by a firm’s own capability rather than by its supply-chain-related decisions. That is, 
under this approach, the likelihood is shaped by the extent a firm is able to identify and remove 
potential triggers of supplier non-compliance. Only if a firm lacks capability, then decisions such 
as supply base size and selection standard affect the likelihood of non-compliance. 
Conjecture 6. A firm engaged in risk mitigation should seek to increase its capability 
to achieve a lower likelihood of non-compliance. 
Conjecture 7. A firm engaged in risk mitigation that lacks capability should increase 
its selection standard to achieve a lower likelihood of non-compliance. 
Conjecture 8. A firm engaged in risk mitigation that lacks capability should have a 
small supply base to achieve a lower likelihood of non-compliance. 
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The effect of parameters under risk tolerance  
Some firms choose not to invest significant resources in managing supplier risks and tolerate 
possible supplier non-compliance. One would expect these firms to face high level of likelihood 
of non-compliance. In general, the simulation results provide support for this a priori expecta-
tion. In addition, the simulation clarifies that just as under relationship enabled risk avoidance, 
under risk tolerance the likelihood of non-compliance depends to a greater extent on the size of a 
firm’s supply base. Specifically, the simulation reveals the non-linear effect of supply-base-size 
on the likelihood of non-compliance, similar to that observed under relationship enabled risk 
avoidance. This similarity between the two approaches is likely because neither approach relies 
on monitoring supplier processes. However, under risk tolerance the non-linear effect is more 
pronounced and characterized by a threshold. Above this threshold, increasing supply base size 
no longer increases the likelihood. Below the threshold, decreasing supply base size decreases 
the likelihood at an increasing rate (Figure 14). The non-linear effect of supply base size reveals 
an interesting result: a smaller supply base allows a firm engaged in risk tolerance to face lower 
likelihood of non-compliance even if both the firm’s capability and its selection standard are 
low. In addition, if a firm chooses to have a small supply base it can further decrease the likeli-
hood of non-compliance by increasing its selection standard and terminating relationships with 
non-compliant suppliers (Figure 15). In contrast, if a firm engaged in risk tolerance decides to 
have a large supply base, neither these decisions nor the exact size of supply base affect the like-
lihood of non-compliance. Furthermore, firms engaged in risk tolerance tend to face similar like-
lihood of non-compliance regardless of their capability (Figure 15). The reason lies in limited 
efforts to manage supplier risks under risk tolerance. Capability determines how effective a 
firm’s efforts are at managing supplier risks. Since under risk tolerance these efforts are limited, 
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the effect of capability on the likelihood of supplier non-compliance is also limited. As Figure 15 
shows, the expected positive impact of capability appears only when a firm has a small supply 
base. 
 
Figure 14. The role of a firm’s supply base size in determining the likelihood of supplier non-
compliance under risk tolerance  
 91 
 
Figure 15. The role of a firm’s capability in determining the likelihood of supplier non-
compliance under risk tolerance in small and large supply bases 
Conjecture 9. A firm engaged in risk tolerance should have a small supply base to 
achieve a lower likelihood of non-compliance. 
Conjecture 10. A firm engaged in risk tolerance that has a small supply base can fur-
ther decrease the likelihood of non-compliance by  
(a) terminating its relationships with a supplier that has caused a non-
compliance; or 
(b) having greater capability; or 
(c) increasing its selection standard. 
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Comparing approaches to supplier risk management 
The second part of the analysis focuses on comparing the likelihood of non-compliance a firm 
faces under each of the four approaches to supplier risks. In general, one would expect risk toler-
ance to be associated with the highest likelihood of supplier non-compliance and risk mitigation 
to be associated with the lowest likelihood of supplier non-compliance. However, the impact of 
engaging in either relationship enabled risk avoidance or stakeholder enabled risk avoidance on 
the likelihood of supplier non-compliance is unclear. Consequently, these two approaches to 
supplier risk management is the focus of the following analysis. First, it remains unclear whether 
relationship enabled risk avoidance resembles risk tolerance or risk mitigation. On the one hand, 
similar to risk tolerance, relationship enabled risk avoidance does not depend on having com-
prehensive information on potential triggers of supplier risks. On the other hand, firms use rela-
tionship enabled risk avoidance because they firmly believe that their suppliers are motivated to 
remain compliant. Second, it is unclear whether stakeholder enabled risk avoidance is superior 
to risk mitigation. On the one hand, the involved stakeholder not only monitors supplier process-
es but also keeps a firm’s suppliers accountable for their non-compliances and thus provides ex-
ternal incentives for the suppliers to remain compliant. On the other hand, an involved stake-
holder may lack the capability to identify potential triggers of supplier non-compliance.  
The analysis described below addresses these questions. First it focuses on comparing rela-
tionship enabled risk avoidance with risk tolerance and risk mitigation. Then it compares stake-
holder enabled risk avoidance with risk mitigation. I exclude risk tolerance from the latter anal-
ysis because the cases in which powerful external stakeholders are involved in controlling firms’ 
suppliers reveal that such a stakeholder involvement exists due to the high potential impact a 
supplier non-compliance can have not only on the firms, but also on the final customers. There-
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fore, due to the high-risk impact, one would not expect firms in these industries to engage in risk 
tolerance.  
The simulation results propose that relationship enabled risk avoidance tends to allow firms 
to achieve a lower likelihood of non-compliance than under risk tolerance (Figures 16 and 17). 
Yet, four conditions can reduce the likelihood gap between using relationship enabled risk 
avoidance and risk tolerance. First, as portrayed in Figure 16, lower capability level reduces the 
gap. A low-capability firm engaged in relationship enabled risk avoidance faces a likelihood of 
supplier non-compliance similar to the likelihood under risk tolerance. Figure 16 also demon-
strates that lowering selection standard increases the likelihood of non-compliance under rela-
tionship enabled risk avoidance, making it more similar to that under risk tolerance. Overall, the 
impact of having low capability or selection standard on the likelihood of supplier non-
compliance points out to the same conclusion: choosing suppliers motivated to remain compliant 
by selecting suppliers that face high risk impact (, is insufficient to ensure compliance. Relation-
ship enabled risk avoidance is superior to risk tolerance in decreasing the likelihood of supplier 
non-compliance only if a firm addresses the threat of adverse selection. That is, only a capable 
firm with high selection standard can ensure that it selects capable suppliers and thus eliminates 
the threat of adverse selection.  
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Figure 16. The role of a firm’s capability in determining the likelihood of supplier non-
compliance under risk tolerance vs. under relationship-enabled risk avoidance 
Third, the likelihood of non-compliance under relationship enabled risk avoidance approach-
es the likelihood under risk tolerance when a firm continues relationships with suppliers that 
have failed to comply (Figure 17). Despite the emphasis on relationship continuity among firms 
relying on relational governance (Jiang, 2009; Nyaga et al., 2010), from the risk management 
perspective a firm engaged in relationship enabled risk avoidance rarely benefits from continu-
ing relationships with suppliers that have failed to comply. This result provides a support for Vil-
lena et al.’s (2011) warning against over-relying on trust-based relationships. Finally, a firm en-
gaged in relationship enabled risk avoidance that chooses to increase its supply base faces an 
increasing likelihood of supplier non-compliance, thus decreasing the gap with risk tolerance 
(Figure 17). However, the effect of the supply base size on that gap is small because none of the-
se approaches requires comprehensive information on supplier processes, while both face a non-
linear effect of supply base size on the likelihood of non-compliance. Therefore, under both ap-
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proaches, a firm with a large supply base faces an increasing chance that the threat of adverse 
selection has materialized.  
 
Figure 17. The role of a firm’s supply base size in determining the likelihood of supplier non-
compliance under risk tolerance vs. under relationship-enabled risk avoidance 
Conjecture 11. A firm faces a lower likelihood of non-compliance if it engages in re-
lationship enabled risk avoidance rather than in risk tolerance, but both likelihoods 
converge if 
(a) it continues relationships with a supplier that has caused a non-compliance; or 
(b) its capability level decreases; or 
(c) it decreases its selection standard; or 
(d) it increases its supply base size. 
The simulation further compares relationship enabled risk avoidance and risk mitigation. The 
simulation results show that for high-capability firms, risk mitigation is the better choice. In con-
trast, if a firm engaged in relationship enabled risk avoidance lacks capability, then it can 
achieve a likelihood of supplier non-compliance that is similar to that under risk mitigation. In 
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fact, a firm faces a lower likelihood of non-compliance under relationship enabled risk avoid-
ance than under risk mitigation provided it makes the following supply-chain-related decisions. 
First, supply base size must be small, with the likelihood of non-compliance decreasing at an in-
creasing rate as the size diminishes (Figure 18). Second, rather than requesting a corrective ac-
tion from non-compliant suppliers, the firm should terminate the relationships (Figure 19). Third, 
the firm’s selection standard for determining the minimum level of capability for each of its se-
lected suppliers must be as strict as possible, with the likelihood of non-compliance decreasing at 
an increasing rate as the selection standard increases (Figure 19).  The rationale for this finding 
goes as follows. When a firm believes that its suppliers can ensure compliance without its direct 
involvement, it faces a threat of overestimating its suppliers’ likelihood to comply. A small sup-
ply base, that is selected using strict criteria and faces termination for non-compliance, diminish-
es this threat. High capability firms that make these choices will also reduce the likelihood of 
non-compliance when using relationship enabled risk avoidance. However, high capability firms 
still have lower likelihood of non-compliance when they use risk mitigation.  
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Figure 18. The role of a firm’s capability in determining the likelihood of supplier non-
compliance under risk mitigation vs. under relationship-enabled risk avoidance in small and 
large supply bases (selection standard set at 0.9)  
 
Figure 19. The role of a firm’s selection standard in determining the likelihood of supplier non-
compliance under risk mitigation vs. under relationship-enabled risk avoidance (firm’s capabil-
ity set at 0.5; supply base set at 2) 
Conjecture 12. A firm faces a higher likelihood of non-compliance if it engages in 
relationship enabled risk avoidance rather than in risk mitigation, but both likeli-
hoods converge if 
(a) it terminates relationships with a supplier that has caused a non-compliance; 
or 
(b) its capability level decreases; or 
(c) it increases its selection standard; or 
(d) it decreases its supply base size. 
Conjecture 13. A firm should favor relationship enabled risk avoidance over risk 
mitigation when all conditions in Conjecture 12 are present. 
Having a stakeholder regulating suppliers is generally not a firm’s choice. Nevertheless, the 
simulation allows to examine whether firms benefit from such an arrangement in terms of risk 
 98 
management. The simulation reveals that one should compare a firm’s capability and that of the 
involved stakeholder to understand whether the firm benefits from a powerful external stake-
holder regulating its suppliers. In general, a firm should favor stakeholder enabled risk avoid-
ance over risk mitigation, even when its capability exceeds the stakeholder’s capability. The 
likely reason is the stakeholder’s dual role of monitoring and incentivizing suppliers. However, 
as portrayed in Figure 20, this only holds true as long as the firm’s capability does not exceed a 
certain threshold. Everything else being equal, this threshold is higher when the firm has a small-
er supply base. In other words, even when the stakeholder’s capability is relatively lower than 
the firm’s capability, a small supply base can enable the firm to prefer stakeholder enabled risk 
avoidance over risk mitigation (Figure 20). On the other hand, a firm with a large supply base 
should prefer stakeholder enabled risk avoidance over risk mitigation only if the stakeholder’s 
capability is marginally lower than the firm’s capability (Figure 20). Having a larger supply base 
makes it more likely that the firm sources from a supplier that cannot assure compliance, despite 
the stakeholder involvement. In contrast, under risk mitigation the likelihood of non-compliance 
is less sensitive to the supply base size. Finally, the simulation also suggests a relationship be-
tween the selection standards for the suppliers’ capability and a firm’s likelihood of non-
compliance for these suppliers. As portrayed in Figure 21, even when stakeholders possess low 
capability, the firm should favor stakeholder enabled risk avoidance over risk mitigation if its 
supply base is small and its selection standard is high. In other words, to compensate for the 
stakeholder’s insufficient ability to ensure supplier compliance, the firm should source from 
fewer suppliers and increase their selection standards.  
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Figure 20. The role of a firm’s capability in determining the likelihood of supplier non-
compliance under risk mitigation vs. under stakeholder-enabled risk avoidance in small and 
large supply bases (stakeholder’s capability set at 0.5) 
 
Figure 21. The role of a firm’s selection standard in determining the likelihood of supplier non-
compliance under risk mitigation vs. under stakeholder-enabled risk avoidance in small and 
large supply bases (firm’s capability set at 0.5; stakeholder’s capability set at 0.1) 
Conjecture 14. When the involved stakeholder’s capability is higher than the firm’s, 
the firm should favor stakeholder enabled risk avoidance over risk mitigation. 
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Conjecture 15. A firm with a large supply base should favor stakeholder enabled risk 
avoidance over risk mitigation even if the stakeholder’s capability is marginally low-
er than the firm’s. 
Conjecture 16. A firm with a small supply base and strict selection standard should 
favor stakeholder enabled risk avoidance over risk mitigation even when the stake-
holder’s capability is significantly lower than the firm’s. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION 
The supplier risk management literature posits that effective management of supplier non-
compliance requires comprehensive information on supplier processes to engage in risk mitiga-
tion. This recommendation originates from agency theory, which argues that a principal (i.e., a 
firm) should rely on behavioral control when facing uncertainty associated with an agent’s (i.e., a 
supplier’s) behavior (Eisenhardt, 1989A; Zsidisin and Ellram, 2003). The initial aim of this re-
search was to collect case study data to understand how in practice firms acquire comprehensive 
information on supplier processes to identify and manage supplier risks and then to build an 
agent-based simulation to clarify how firms should acquire this information.  
The collected cases, however, revealed that many firms believed that they were effectively 
managing supplier risks without having comprehensive information on supplier processes. Along 
with risk mitigation, the firms in the case studies engaged in three other approaches to supplier 
risk management: stakeholder enabled risk avoidance, relationship enabled risk avoidance, and 
risk tolerance. These three approaches do not require comprehensive information on supplier 
processes and rely on other means to address the risk of supplier non-compliance. The cases, 
therefore, offered important insights into what firms do to manage supplier risks.  
The agent-based simulation incorporated these unexpected empirical findings and was used to 
determine what firms should do to effectively manage the risk of supplier non-compliance. Spe-
cifically, the simulation explicitly considered varying levels of a buying firm’s capability, al-
lowed manipulating the firm’s supply-base-related decisions and compared the likelihood of 
supplier non-compliance under the four identified approaches to supplier risk management. In 
addition, combining the case studies and the simulation allowed juxtaposing some of the deci-
 102 
sions the sampled firms made with the simulation findings and thus compared what firms do 
with what they should do.  
A decision to mitigate supplier risks 
The literature is clear that collecting comprehensive information on supplier processes is re-
quired but often not done (e.g., Christopher and Lee, 2004; Marucheck et al., 2011; New, 2010). 
The collected cases reveal that firms choose to do it only when they do not have alternative ap-
proaches to address the risk of supplier non-compliance. Specifically, two criteria determine 
whether firms believe that they need to acquire comprehensive information on supplier process-
es: (1) whether suppliers have capabilities sufficient to comply with the firms’ requirements; (2) 
whether suppliers will share the negative impact of their non-compliance. The cases are clear 
that if suppliers fail to meet either of these criteria then the firms will seek comprehensive infor-
mation on supplier processes to mitigate the risk of supplier non-compliance, or will be willing 
to tolerate frequent supplier non-compliances. This finding has an important theoretical implica-
tion. It clarifies the agency theory’s recommendation to use behavioral controls when a principal 
(i.e., a firm) faces high level of uncertainty (e.g., Zsidisin and Ellram, 2003). In the context of 
supplier risk management, this uncertainty can be associated not only with an agent’s (i.e., sup-
plier’s) ability to complete an assigned task, but also with the consequences the agent will face in 
case it fails to complete the task. The results show that either source of uncertainty is sufficient to 
push the principal to take behavioral control measures.  
Furthermore, the supplier risk management literature suggests that a close relationship be-
tween a firm and its supplier is a path to collecting the comprehensive information that risk miti-
gation requires (e.g., Barratt and Oke, 2007; Jonhston et al., 2004). The cases show that when 
firms engage in risk mitigation, it is often because a close relationship is missing and they do not 
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trust the supplier. This finding then contributes to the supplier risk management literature by 
showing that while close relationships may be one means of enabling risk mitigation, they are 
neither always required nor always desirable by either the firm or its suppliers. 
While the cases reveal when firms follow the literature’s recommendation to engage in risk 
mitigation, the simulation shows when firms should do so. The simulation results indicate that 
under risk mitigation the risk of supplier non-compliance is largely determined by a firm’s capa-
bility. For high-capability firms, then, risk mitigation is the best approach to manage the risk of 
supplier non-compliance. Only these firms are able to properly use comprehensive information 
on supplier processes to identify and remove potential triggers of supplier non-compliance. This 
simulation result contributes to both agency theory and the supplier risk management literature 
by elaborating on Fayezi et al.’s (2012) observation that agency theory is built on an assumption 
of “flawless principal”. Specifically, it shows that agency theory’s recommendation to engage in 
behavioral control relies on an assumption that the principal knows how to control an agent’s 
behavior. The supplier risk management literature shares this assumption with agency theory and 
therefore provides guidance only when this capability does exist. 
In addition, the simulation allows examining some decisions made by the sampled firms en-
gaged in risk mitigation and hence contributes to practice. For instance, the sampled firms do not 
use strict selection standards for their suppliers. The simulation shows that under risk mitigation, 
selection standards have a limited impact on the likelihood of non-compliance. Overall, risk mit-
igation depends on a firm’s own efforts and resources to ensure compliance and hence does not 
require sourcing from high-capability suppliers. Second, while supply base size among sampled 
firms engaged in risk mitigation varied, the simulation shows that as long as a firm has a high 
capability, it will face only a marginally higher likelihood of non-compliance if it chooses to in-
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crease the size of its supply base. Finally, the sampled firms engaged in risk mitigation have sta-
ble relationship with their supply bases. In doing so, the firms follow the literature’s recommen-
dation to complement contractual governance with certain aspects of relational governance (e.g., 
Poppo and Zenger, 2002). These firms consider their suppliers to be unreliable, and yet they be-
lieve that this practice helps them further mitigate the likelihood of supplier non-compliance. The 
simulation shows that whether or not a firm focuses on a stable relationship with an unreliable 
supplier has little effect on the likelihood of supplier non-compliance. 
A decision to avoid supplier risks 
Marucheck et al. (2011) called for a better understanding of the role supply chain relation-
ships play in managing supplier risks. This research addresses this call. The case results show 
that for three of the sampled firms, relational governance offers a way to avoid supplier risks, but 
these firms rely on it only when they perceive that their suppliers have sufficient capabilities to 
remain compliant and share the potential impact of materialized risks. The firms believe that fos-
tering close ties with these suppliers motivates them to eliminate potential triggers of non-
compliance, since the suppliers value the relationship and would also suffer if something went 
wrong. Interestingly, despite the warning against relying on relationships to manage supplier 
risks (e.g., Harland et al., 2003; Villena et al., 2011), firms facing both high and low impact sup-
plier risks engage in relationship enabled risk avoidance. This finding contributes to supplier 
risk management literature by showing that in practice, behavioral control does not constitute the 
preferred way to manage supplier risks. In fact, the cases indicate that firms prefer relying on an 
input control, in the guise of sourcing from trustworthy suppliers, to engage in risk avoidance. 
These are the same firms that, when they believe suppliers are unreliable, rely on behavioral con-
 105 
trol to mitigate risks. In other words, this is a choice they believe is effective and they are aware 
of risk mitigation as an option. 
The simulation further clarifies that firms with low to average capabilities should prefer rela-
tionship enabled risk avoidance to risk mitigation. Specifically, the simulation results indicate 
that firms without the capability to properly collect and assess this information would be better 
served by using relational governance to manage a small supply base with strong incentives to 
comply. While the case studies show that input control may be preferred to behavioral control, 
this simulation finding offers a contribution to agency theory by showing conditions under which 
a principal firm should favor input control over behavioral control. 
In addition, the simulation contributes to practice by examining a number of decisions made 
by the sampled firms engaged in relationship enabled risk avoidance, particularly those with 
large supply bases. The simulation indicates that to face low likelihood of supplier non-
compliance, these firms should source from a limited number of suppliers. In fact, while the 
sampled firms emphasized the importance of selecting high-capability suppliers, the simulation 
reveals that when these firms source from a large number of suppliers, having high selection 
standards does not significantly reduce the likelihood of non-compliance. Only with a small sup-
ply base, can a firm engaged in relationship enabled risk avoidance diminish the threat of over-
estimating a supplier’s ability to remain compliant. Finally, the sampled firms that are engaged in 
relationship enabled risk avoidance seek to have stable supply bases. The simulation indicates, 
however, that from the perspective of supplier risk management, these firms are better off termi-
nating their relationships with suppliers that have caused a non-compliance. This finding then 
contradicts the focus on close trusting relationships among the sampled firms. 
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Scholars argue that firms can be in a vulnerable position when they have less information 
about their supplier risks than their stakeholders do (e.g., New, 2010; Scherer et al., 2013). The 
remedy is to promptly identify potential triggers of supplier risks before their stakeholders be-
come aware of them. Nevertheless, the cases reveal that in industries where powerful external 
stakeholders regulate the suppliers, firms often possess less information than their stakeholders. 
In fact, the sampled firms choose not to acquire comprehensive information when powerful ex-
ternal stakeholders regulate and control their supply bases. The firms believe that they do not 
need to know how their suppliers fulfill their orders, because the stakeholders impose strict re-
quirements for supplier processes and then oversee how the suppliers adhere to these require-
ments. These stakeholders also contribute to aligning the goals of suppliers with those of the 
firms by providing suppliers with incentives to remain compliant. Specifically, in these industries 
a supplier’s viability depends to a great extent on its ability to conform to the stakeholder’s re-
quirements. The stakeholder can deprive a non-conforming supplier of its license to operate and, 
as a result, sever relationships with its entire customer base, not just this one buyer. These firms 
believe that relying on behavior-based contractual governance without directly engaging in be-
havioral control is an effective way to manage the risk of supplier non-compliance. Specifically, 
these firms are convinced that the requirements the stakeholders impose on suppliers are suffi-
cient to ensure their compliance. This finding contributes to the supplier risk management litera-
ture by showing that having a powerful external stakeholder regulating suppliers represents an 
input control measure that firms can rely on to engage in risk avoidance. In fact, under these cir-
cumstances firms believe that the input control, in the guise of a powerful external stakeholder 
regulating suppliers, represents a viable alternative to behavioral control. 
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This finding also points out that agency theory’s focus on a principal-agent dyadic relation-
ships (Eisenhardt, 1989B) limits its explanatory power. The cases show that often an agent has 
numerous principals with overlapping goals. In these situations, the actions of one principal can 
shape the actions of other principals. Specifically, if a firm (i.e., one principal) is aware that a 
powerful involved stakeholder (i.e., another principal) controls behavior of a supplier (i.e., an 
agent), these behavioral control measures of the stakeholder represent an input control measure 
for the firm. 
In many industries having a stakeholder regulating suppliers is not a choice. Yet, the simula-
tion allows me to examine if firms benefit from such an arrangement in terms of risk manage-
ment and hence contributes to the supplier risk management literature. Specifically, the simula-
tion compares a firm’s likelihood of non-compliance under stakeholder enabled risk avoidance 
with the likelihood the same firm would have faced if it were to engage in risk mitigation in-
stead. Interestingly, the results suggest that firms should rely on stakeholder enabled risk avoid-
ance, even when the stakeholder does not have high capability. This outcome is likely due to the 
stakeholder’s dual role of monitoring and incentivizing suppliers. So even if the stakeholder is 
not effective at monitoring supplier processes, the suppliers know that the stakeholder is a gate-
keeper to many potential buyers. Therefore, failing to comply with the requirements of one of the 
buyers will likely mean losing business with many buyers not just the one. In addition, the simu-
lation shows that when a firm believes that a stakeholder significantly lacks capability, yet the 
stakeholder must be used, the firm should seek ways to complement the stakeholder’s insuffi-
cient efforts to ensure supplier compliance. Specifically, it should increase selection standards 
and source from fewer suppliers to reduce the likelihood of non-compliance. While the im-
portance of having stricter selection standards is intuitive, the effect of having a small supply 
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base is more nuanced. The simulation results show that if the involved stakeholder has high ca-
pability increasing supply base size only marginally increases the likelihood of non-compliance. 
In contrast, if the stakeholder has low capability, a firm faces a non-linear effect of supply base 
size on the likelihood of non-compliance with the likelihood decreasing at an increasing rate as 
supply base size decreases.  
This non-linear effect of supply base size on the likelihood of supplier non-compliance is ob-
served under relationship enabled risk avoidance and risk tolerance, approaches that do not have 
any party monitoring supplier processes. Yet, this effect can disappear under the two approaches 
to supplier risk management, risk mitigation and stakeholder enabled risk avoidance, that in-
volve correspondingly a focal firm or an involved stakeholder collecting comprehensive infor-
mation on supplier processes. Therefore, this research also contributes to the supplier risk man-
agement literature by revealing the unexpected effect of monitoring supplier processes. When 
supplier processes are monitored, the focal firm can increase the size of its supply base without 
facing a substantial increase in the likelihood of non-compliance. In contrast, two other ap-
proaches to supplier management that do not rely on monitoring supplier processes are associat-
ed with significantly higher likelihood of non-compliance if the firm chooses to increase its sup-
ply base size. This finding then also contributes to practice by showing that in industries with 
complex production requiring a large supply base, a buying firm can assure supplier compliance 
only if the firm or an involved stakeholder monitors supplier processes. 
The supply bases of the case firms that rely on stakeholder enabled risk avoidance vary in 
size; however, these firms are convinced that their stakeholder is highly capable. In addition, the-
se firms focus on having stable relationships with their suppliers. The simulation then contributes 
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to practice by clarifying that under stakeholder enabled risk avoidance a choice to have stable 
supplier relationships with suppliers does not affect the likelihood of supplier non-compliance.  
A decision to tolerate supplier risks 
Finally, this research reveals that some firms do not prioritize addressing the risk of supplier 
non-compliance and choose to engage in risk tolerance. The case firms that engaged in risk tol-
erance face supplier risks of low impact and rely on outcome controls to manage these risks. 
Specifically, they shift the responsibility of identifying potential risk triggers of non-compliance 
onto their suppliers and manage non-compliances only if they materialize. These firms, when 
facing the trade-off between addressing supplier risks and minimizing costs associated with sup-
plier management, choose the latter. In doing so, these firms contradict the supplier risk man-
agement literature that emphasizes the importance of minimizing supplier risks (Sodhi et al., 
2012). Interestingly, the literature largely omits discussing this supplier risk management ap-
proach (Hajmohammad and Vachon, 2016). 
The simulation shows that firms engaged in risk tolerance are expected to face high levels of 
supplier non-compliance. It also allows for an examination of some of the decisions of the sam-
pled firms engaged in risk tolerance, thus contributing to practice. The sampled firms choose to 
have large supply bases, do not focus on having stable supply bases and developed detailed 
standards for supplier selection. The simulation reveals that sourcing from a large number of 
suppliers not only is associated with high likelihood of supplier non-compliance but also signifi-
cantly limits the effect of other decisions on the likelihood. Specifically, in large supply bases 
neither increasing firm’s selection standard nor terminating relationships with non-compliant 
suppliers can significantly lower the likelihood of non-compliance.  
 110 
Limitations 
This research has a number of limitations. First, the collected case data contains only eight 
firms, limiting the ability to generalize to other firms. Second, the collected cross-sectional data 
does not allow examining firm behaviour across time. Only longitudinal data can help gaining a 
more in-depth understanding of how firms identify, manage, and react to supplier non-
compliances. In addition, the simulation reveals the importance of considering firm’s capability 
in the context of supplier risk management; yet, the collected case data cannot provide an objec-
tive assessment of a firm’s capability. Only in-depth longitudinal data can give an insight in how 
capable firms are at managing supplier risks. Another limitation of the collected data is related to 
the three cases, where external stakeholders were involved in regulating firms’ suppliers. While 
the data included extensive documentation on the stakeholders’ practices, it did not contain any 
interviews with the stakeholders’ representatives. 
The agent-based simulation is based on the case studies and allows exploring decisions across 
time, yet this simulation is a considerable simplification of the observed firm behaviour. In fact, I 
limited the simulation complexity because Wilensky and Rand (2015) recommended doing so 
when the application of agent-based simulations in a certain context is relatively new, as is the 
case with supplier risk management. In particular, the simulation considers only a firm’s rela-
tionships with its first-tier suppliers. The decision to consider single-tier supply networks was, in 
part, based on how the case firms managed their suppliers, but clearly some supplier risks have 
origins beyond the first tier of suppliers. Managing such risks might require different means of 
control or have different outcomes. 
There are also a number of limitations associated with the specifics of the simulation algo-
rithm. First, built from the supplier risk management perspective, the simulation does not take 
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into account other criteria that can influence a firm’s decisions. For instance, the literature 
acknowledges that both relationship enabled risk avoidance and risk mitigation are resource in-
tensive approaches to supplier risk management (e.g., Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Selviaridis and 
Norrman, 2014). Yet, the simulation analyzes only how a decision to engage in either relation-
ship enabled risk avoidance or risk mitigation affects the likelihood of non-compliance, without 
considering any associated costs. In particular, the simulation does not consider the cost associ-
ated with collecting comprehensive information on supplier processes, nor does it take into ac-
count coordination costs associated with increasing the size of a firm’s supply base. In addition, 
the simulation focuses on a supply chain of a single firm, and yet suppliers rarely have only one 
buyer. The simulation, however, does not capture how actions of other buyers may affect suppli-
er behaviour or the actions of the focal firm. Finally, I started building the simulation after the 
case data collection had been completed. Approaching the simulation in such a way revealed an 
important limitation: the process of simulation building offered a number of important insights 
into how firms may manage the risk of supplier non-compliance, and yet I could not use these 
insights to influence what case data was collected. 
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION  
This research began with the literature’s supposition that firms benefit from having transpar-
ent supply chains. The first stage of this research, case studies, clarified that firms saw benefit in 
having transparent relationships with their first-tier suppliers, and not the entire supply chain. 
These firms acquired comprehensive information on the processes of their first-tier suppliers to 
have an ability to mitigate the risk of supplier non-compliance. The case studies also indicated 
that many firms did not follow the literature’s recommendation to create transparent supply 
chains, as they relied on other means to address the risk of supplier non-compliance. The second 
stage of the research, an agent-based simulation, then showed the conditions when firms should 
follow the literature’s recommendation and when they should not. Combining a simulation with 
qualitative studies has offered an opportunity to both describe what firms actually do and to ex-
amine whether they make appropriate decisions, that is, what they should do. It has thus enabled 
me to offer contributions to theory and practice that would not have been possible using either 
approach alone.  
This research showed how various firms should address the risk of supplier non-compliance. 
Only firms that possess high capability to assess and monitor supplier processes should favor 
mitigating the risk of supplier non-compliance, which is the approach the supplier risk manage-
ment literature recommends for all firms. Firms that lack this capability are better off not acquir-
ing comprehensive information on supplier processes to engage in risk mitigation, because they 
are unable to use this information to substantially reduce the likelihood of supplier non-
compliance. Instead, they should seek to avoid the risk of supplier non-compliance.  
This research highlighted two paths firms may take to avoid, rather than mitigate, the risk of 
supplier non-compliance. The first path is to rely on close relationships with suppliers. The sam-
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pled firms that chose to rely on that path did not seek to collect comprehensive information, be-
cause they believed that a close relationship could provide incentives for suppliers to comply, 
thus making the risk of non-compliance negligible. These were the same firms that, when they 
believed suppliers were unreliable, did collect such information. Therefore, this was an approach 
they believed was effective in avoiding the risk of supplier non-compliance. The second stage of 
this research, simulation, then showed that this approach might be suitable, especially for low-
capability firms. An alternative path to avoid supplier risks exists in industries where a powerful 
external stakeholder is involved in controlling the suppliers. Due to the stakeholder’s dual role of 
monitoring and incentivizing suppliers, firms in these industries can benefit from the stakehold-
er’s involvement, even when their capability to assess supplier processes is higher, often signifi-
cantly higher, than that of the stakeholder.  
This research also contributed to agency theory by addressing the theory’s assumption of a 
“flawless” principal that has the capability to accurately assess an agent’s behavior (Fayezi et al., 
2012). The results showed that a principal might lack the ability to effectively control agent be-
havior, which can in turn shape what approach the principal should take to ensure that the agent 
successfully completes an assigned task. Specifically, a principal that lacks capability is more 
likely to successfully control the agent if it chooses input control (i.e., selecting a highly incen-
tivized agent) over behavioral control (i.e., verifying how an agent completes an assigned task). 
The results then stress the importance of considering the decision-making of flawed principals in 
agency theory, both within and outside the realm of supplier risk management.  
Despite a growing number of calls for the use of agent-based simulation in supply chain man-
agement (e.g., Gilbert, 2008; Macal and North, 2005; Van Der Zee and Van Der Vorst, 2005), 
studies that employ this method are still scarce. This research answered these calls by revealing 
 114 
the ability of agent-based simulations to offer a valid representation of a complex supply chain 
management phenomenon. As the nature of agent-based modeling allows for extending already 
developed simulations, my simulation framework provides a starting point to continue this re-
search in the context of more complex supply networks. A first natural extension is to focus on 
sustainability risks (Hajmohammad and Vachon, 2016) and explore how firms should manage 
these risks in complex supply networks. One of the difficulties firms face when they seek to ad-
dress sustainability risks in their supply chains is that unlike supply delays or poor product quali-
ty, sustainability risks can remain unidentified over long periods of time. Managing sustainability 
risks beyond first-tier suppliers represents an even more challenging task. Research based on an 
agent-based model can thus contribute to the supply chain management literature by showing 
how firms should manage these risks.  
Another fruitful avenue for future research lies in further investigating the involvement of ex-
ternal stakeholders in supply chains and, more specifically, in exploring how firms rely on exter-
nal stakeholders to ensure sustainability compliance of their suppliers. Unlike product-quality 
compliance, sustainability compliance is harder to ensure, as the standards to measure it remain 
largely undefined (Shevchenko et al., 2016). Hence, outsourcing the efforts to ensure sustainabil-
ity compliance to an external stakeholder is likely to require a greater level of cooperation be-
tween the firm and the stakeholder. Focusing on an industry with stakeholder involvement and 
using qualitative methods to gather in-depth data will shed more light on how the stakeholders 
ensure supplier compliance to their requirements, and how firms and their suppliers react to the 
stakeholder involvement. In the Canadian paper industry, for instance, the Forest Stewardship 
Council (FSC, 2017), a powerful NGO, plays an active role in assuring sustainability of wood 
sourcing. Research focused on this industry can contribute to the supply chain management liter-
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ature by showing how firms cooperate with an external stakeholder to adapt to changing re-
quirements for suppliers’ sustainability compliance. 
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APPENDIX A. RELATED CONCEPTS AND SYSTEMATIC LITERATURE REVIEW 
The supply chain management literature employs three concepts that are related to the notion 
of a firm acquiring information on supplier processes. The most commonly used concept is sup-
ply chain transparency. Two other concepts are supply chain traceability and supply chain visi-
bility. Table A1 shows their definitions. 
Concept Citation Definition 
Traceability Pagell and Wu (2009) 
"an internal practice of sharing information among chain members 
about materials and methods (toxins, use of child labor, type of solvents 
used and so on) to optimize noneconomic chain performance and mini-
mize risks" (p. 44) 
Traceability Khabbazi et al. 2011) "the ability to retain the identity of the product and its origin and its use nowadays concerns both government and business" (p. 732) 
Traceability Wang et al. (2009) "the ability to trace and follow food, feed, and ingredients through all stages of production, processing and distribution" (p. 2866) 
Traceability Roth et al. (2008) “assurance of expected quality through close identification of producer, branding or certification” (p. 26) 
Visibility Barratt and Oke (2007) 
"the extent to which actors within a supply chain have access to or share 
information which they consider as key or useful for their operations 
and which they consider will be of mutual benefit" (p. 1218) 
Visibility Wang and Wei (2007) 
"the degree to which supply chain partners have on-hand information 
related to demand and supply for planning and control management" (p. 
662) 
Visibility Williams et al. (2013) 
"the access to high quality information that describes various factors of 
demand and supply.. in order for information to be of high quality, it 
must be accurate, timely, complete, and in usable forms" (p. 545) 
Visibility Co and Barro (2009) “the practice of "capturing and analyzing supply chain data that informs decision-making, mitigates risk, and improves processes"” (p. 592) 
Visibility Dentchev, (2004)  “the extent to which internal and external stakeholders can observe and recognize [corporate social performance]" (p. 400) 
Table A1. Definitions of supply chain traceability and supply chain visibility 
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The concept of supply chain traceability is closely related to supply chain transparency. In 
fact, Pagell and Wu’s (2009) definition of traceability is similar to how others refer to supply 
chain transparency. Many define traceability as a product-level construct that shows an extent to 
which a buying firm has identified the origins of its product components (Roth et al. 2008; 
Khabbazi et al., 2009; Wang et al., 2009). Overall, one can view traceability as a special case of 
supply chain transparency that focuses on the product, its components and origins. 
Finally, supply chain visibility is focused on the information essential for matching supply 
and demand on a day-to-day basis. For instance, Wang and Wei (2007: 652) in their study on 
supply chain visibility focus on the information required “for planning and control management". 
Barratt and Oke (2007: 1218) argue that supply chain visibility allows supply chain partners to 
"have access or share information which they consider as key or useful for their operations". On 
a day-to-day basis many firms strive to acquire various information about supplier processes in-
cluding suppliers’ inventory levels and promotions, changes in product line, and lead time (Wil-
liams et al., 2013; Wang and Wei, 2007; Co and Barro, 2009). That is, supply chain visibility is 
focused on ensuring that a firm has information to achieve sufficient coordination between sup-
ply and demand. 
Overall, these three concepts - supply chain transparency, traceability, supply chain visibility 
– are related to the notion of a firm acquiring information on supplier processes. They tend to 
differ in the underlying reason why the information is acquired. Supply chain transparency is 
about ensuring that supplier processes would not have significant negative impact on the firm or 
its stakeholders. Traceability is focused on the information needed to identify the origins of a 
firm’s purchases. Finally, supply chain visibility is concerned with acquiring information needed 
to match supply and demand. To have a better understanding of what supply chain management 
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literature knows about how firms acquire information on supplier processes I conducted system-
atic literature review based on these three concepts.  
The relevant literature was selected using systematic review through Google Scholar database 
(www.scholar.google.com). The main advantage of the systematic review is that it helps to en-
sure that the process of selecting articles is unbiased and its results are replicable (Carter and 
Easton, 2011). To have a wider scope I chose journals from a range of management areas, in-
cluding supply chain management, management science, strategy, and business ethics. The com-
plete journal list consisted of the following 23 journals: 
Academy of Management Journal 
Academy of Management Review 
Administrative Science Quarterly 
Decision Science Journal 
IEEE Transactions 
International Journal of Operations & Production Management  
International Journal of Physical Distribution and Logistics Management 
International Journal of Production Research 
International Journal of Production Economics 
Journal of Business Ethics 
Journal of Business Venturing 
Journal of Business Logistics 
Journal of Cleaner Production 
Journal of Management Studies 
Journal of Operations Management 
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Journal of Supply Chain Management 
Management Science 
Omega 
Organization Science 
Production and Operations Management 
Strategic Management Journal 
Supply Chain Management: An International Journal 
These journals were searched through Google Scholar database using the following key 
terms: supply chain transparency, supply chain traceability, supply chain visibility. The results of 
the search initially produced 504 articles, out of which 154 articles were relevant to the topic of 
this research. 
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APPENDIX B. CASE STUDY PROTOCOL 
Overview of the case study 
Mission and goals 
The goal of this study is to understand how firm acquire information required to identify sup-
plier non-compliance. It is a first stage of a two-stage research project, and its results will be 
used to inform the second stage of the project, an agent-based simulation model. 
Theoretical framework  
Based on the existing literature, two theoretical themes were identified to form a sampling 
matrix. These themes are relationship with suppliers (firm size is used as a proxy) and a driver to 
ensure compliance. The sampling matrix is shown in Figure 1 in the main body of the manu-
script.  
Research questions 
General research question:  
• How do firms acquire information required to identify supplier non-compliance? 
Specific research questions:  
• What role do buyer-supplier relationships play in the process of acquiring information re-
quired to identify supplier non-compliance? 
• What are the most important supplier risks a firm seeks to mitigate?  
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• What role do a firm’s external stakeholders play in the process acquiring information re-
quired to identify supplier non-compliance? 
Data collection procedure 
Fieldwork 
The case study data will be collected by two persons to ensure the reliability of the results of 
the study. The interviews will be recorded and then transcribed. Relevant documentation will be 
collected on site and online. 
Data collection plan 
This study will have multiple cases. Ultimate the final number of case studies will be deter-
mined when the data collection process will reach theoretical saturation (Eisenhardt, 1989B). 
Preparation for the fieldwork 
For the purposes of the study, we will identify companies that actively pursue the goal of en-
suring supplier compliance. The study will cover multiple industries. We will sample both small 
and large firms that ensure compliance both because of their own vulnerability to supplier risks 
and because of stakeholder pressure. 
Data collection questions 
• What is your role in the company?  
• Can you describe your previous work experience and education? 
• How many employees are in the company?  
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• How many are employed in production?   
• Why do customers buy your products?  
• Who are your main competitors? 
• Can you describe the structure of your company’s supply chain? 
• What kind of information do you obtain from your suppliers? 
• Can you describe the process of gathering information about your suppliers?  
• How are you involved in this process? 
• How do you use the information about your suppliers?  
• What do your customers want to know about your suppliers? 
• Do you trust your supply chain partners? How so? 
• What are the other important stakeholders of the company?  
• What do stakeholders want to know about supply chain?  
• How do you share the information with stakeholders? 
Case study report 
Audience for the results 
The audience of the results of this study includes management scholars and practitioners in-
terested in the subject of the study. 
Further steps in the study 
The results of case study will be used in the build an agent-based simulation. The simulation 
aims to answer the following research question, how should firms acquire information required 
to identify supplier non-compliance?  
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APPENDIX C. CASE DESCRIPTION 
 
AEROSPACE 
This case focuses on a small component manufacturer in the aerospace industry that faces the 
risk of its suppliers undermining the quality of its components. The firm manufactures custom-
ized mechanical components in small volumes for approximately 20 military and aerospace 
OEMs. These OEMs procure from the firm because of its high engineering capability, its ad-
vanced production processes that ensure high product quality, and its responsiveness to customer 
requirements.  
The aerospace industry is characterized by stable relationships among supply chain partners. 
There are two main reasons behind such relationships. First, the industry has undergone signifi-
cant consolidation across all supply chain tiers. Second, the final customers and the regulators 
impose significant sourcing restrictions. As a result, firms in this industry do not have many 
competitors but at the same time cannot easily find new customers.  
Aerospace components are a niche market where product quality is the main priority. To 
compete the firm needs to have a supply base that can provide products of high and consistent 
quality without an opportunity to repeatedly improve the products. AEROSPACE relies on a 
number of critical-to-quality suppliers that provide such services as casting, anodizing, and 
grinding. These suppliers are a potential source of the firm’s main supplier risk. The risk is that 
one of its service suppliers lacks capabilities and would undermine product quality. The risk is 
exacerbated by the small volumes the firm tends to order, making it hard to identify non-
compliant components.  
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The risk of a supplier undermining product quality is a high impact supplier risk. The firm’s 
final customers – producers of aerospace and defense machinery – face the threat of operational 
catastrophe if non-compliant mechanical components are installed in their products. If this sup-
plier risk materializes, it will significantly harm the firm’s reputation, severe its relationships 
with its existing customers, and undermine its position in the industry. Overall, AEROSPACE 
faces significant external drivers to ensure that its critical-to-quality suppliers can assure high 
product quality.  
Due to high potential risk impact, the final customers strive to ensure that even at lower tiers 
of their supply chains firms have needed processes in place. For that reason, they endorse indus-
try certifications, AS9100 and NADCAP. These certifications had been developed to provide 
objective ways to assess all aspects of production. They specify requirements for various types of 
production processes and oversee how firms in this industry adhere to these requirements. Hav-
ing these certifications became an order qualifier for the industry members. Overall, AERO-
SPACE’s management believes that due to the involvement of the certification bodies it faces a 
low-likelihood supplier risk.  
If a service supplier undermines the quality of the firm’s mechanical components it is ex-
pected to share the impact of its non-compliance. First, a non-compliant supplier can lose its 
NADCAP and/or AS9100 certifications and, as a result, its current customers in the aerospace 
industry. Second, AEROSPACE keeps its suppliers financially responsible for any non-
compliance via contractual obligations.  
The presence of NADCAP and AS9100 certifications influences how the firm governs its 
suppliers. Overall, because of this stakeholder involvement the firm engages in behavior-based
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supplier governance. The certification bodies enable two essential aspects of this governance 
mechanism. These organizations periodically monitor suppliers to ensure that they have suffi-
cient production capabilities to maintain high product quality and incentivize the suppliers to 
comply with the requirements for production processes.  
As a result, AEROSPACE chooses not to acquire comprehensive information on processes of 
its critical-to-quality suppliers. The firm relies on these certifications to control and regulate its 
suppliers and trusts that the certification auditors properly assess the suppliers’ production pro-
cesses. At the same time, the firm has developed close relationship with its service suppliers and 
invests resources in supplier education. Moreover, it had integrated some of these suppliers and 
had moved them to the facilities in a close proximity to its own facility. The firm can directly 
observe how NADCAP and/or AS9100 conduct monitoring as the firm and its integrated suppli-
ers have these certifications. 
AEROSPACE manages the risk of a supplier undermining product quality by avoiding it. The 
firm believes that its suppliers ensure that, if ever produced, any non-compliant components are 
destroyed and would never reach the firm or its customers. It relies on NADCAP and AS9100 
certifications to verify that its suppliers have sufficient capabilities to produce products of high 
quality. In their oversight of the firm’s suppliers, the certifying organizations assess suppliers’ 
production processes to ensure their compliance with the requirements established in the aero-
space/defense industry.   
AUTO-PARTS 
AUTO PARTS is a large retailer that specializes in automotive products. It carries a large in-
ventory of such products ranging from car mats to automotive batteries to wiper blades. The tar-
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get consumer group for these products is young families that prefer buying inexpensive but rela-
tively reliable products. 
The supplier risk the firm faces is a supplier failing to produce products at an acceptable qual-
ity level. The firm is externally driven to address this risk as customer satisfaction is easily af-
fected by poor product quality. In fact, the market for automotive products is associated with low 
brand loyalty: customers dissatisfied with a product quality are likely to buy automotive products 
elsewhere. In addition, stocking defective products leads to financial losses.  
Overall, this is a low impact risk. If the firm’s supplier fails to achieve acceptable product 
quality, the materialized risk is likely to lead to financial losses and to poor customer satisfac-
tion. However, the firm offers a large variety of products sourced from hundreds of suppliers and 
one non-compliant supplier is unlikely to have a lasting negative effect on the firm.  
The firm has a large supply base. It sources automotive products from more than 500 suppli-
ers. Its supply base for the automotive products is located in China. These suppliers are clustered 
in coastal areas close to Shanghai and Hong Kong. Many of these suppliers are SMEs.  
AUTO-PARTS’s priority is to source from suppliers that can produce high volumes of prod-
ucts at a low cost. The product quality plays a secondary role: only once potential suppliers are 
chosen, the firm’s quality team ensures that these suppliers can achieve an acceptable level of 
product quality. Furthermore, the firm believes that many of their suppliers have corner-cutting 
culture and might be unable to provide consistent level of product quality during mass produc-
tion. Therefore, the risk of a supplier failing to achieve acceptable quality level has high likeli-
hood. 
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Because the firm’s suppliers face the pressures to produce high volumes of products at a low 
cost, they do not have sufficient incentives to ensure that the products they manufacture can con-
sistently meet the required quality standards. Suppliers do not share the impact of this risk with 
the firm, and therefore only the firm is negatively affected if the risk is materialized.  
The firm interacts with its suppliers mostly during the supplier selection process. The firm’s 
quality team conducts an initial visit focusing on a supplier’s processes and its manufacturing 
capability. In particular, it assesses how the supplier controls incoming materials and how it tests 
its products. Once the firm selects a supplier, a sample of the supplier’s products undergoes pro-
totype testing in one of 3rd party testing laboratories. After prototype testing, the firm asks the 
supplier to start mass production and from that point controls product quality via random testing.  
On a monthly basis, AUTO-PARTS rates its products based on the defect cost and identifies 
non-compliant suppliers. It uses consumer feedback and product returns as additional sources of 
information about any issues with product quality. Low-rated suppliers go through more frequent 
product testing and their products are audited more frequently before shipping.  
AUTO-PARTS relies on outcome-based supplier governance. The firm sources from suppli-
ers that can achieve the needed outcomes: producing high volumes of low-cost products of ac-
ceptable quality. Overall, the firm assumes that suppliers are able to achieve the needed outcome 
levels, unless there are indications of non-compliance.  
Overall, AUTO-PARTS tolerates certain level of the supplier risk. Because the impact of the 
supplier risk is low the firm accepts its high likelihood. The size of its supply base would make 
extremely resource intensive to acquire information on supplier processes and mitigate supplier 
non-compliances across its entire supply base. For that reason, the firm tends to address the risk 
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only if it materializes and only if the costs associated with the non-compliant supplier are signifi-
cant.  
AUTOMATION 
AUTOMATION is a large company that manufactures engineer-to-order equipment. The 
firm’s products range from material handling systems for assembly lines to control cabinet for 
factory automation to pneumatic cylinders. The firm expects to increase customer base for these 
products in the upcoming years growing at a double-digit rate.  
The firm’s Canadian office works with approximately 80 OEMs on a regular basis. Their cus-
tomers range from medical equipment producers to laboratory automation providers to automo-
bile tier 1 manufacturers. The key to increasing its market share is building close relationship 
with its customers and satisfying their increasing requirements. Their customers put significant 
cost pressures and choose to source from AUTOMATION because of its ability to ensure the 
required product quality level despite the cost pressures. The firm strives to protect its reputation 
of a quality-focused company. For instance, it does not take on contracts that can make it impos-
sible to ensure acceptable product quality and can compromise its R&D efforts.  
At the same time, given the cost pressures the firm faces, it cannot source from suppliers with 
highest manufacturing capabilities and instead selects suppliers that can provide low-cost com-
ponents of acceptable quality. For that reason, AUTOMATION faces the risk of its suppliers 
failing to achieve acceptable quality level. This supplier risk has high likelihood. The firm’s sup-
pliers are under considerable cost pressures and do not have sufficient incentives to ensure that 
the products they manufacture consistently meet the requirements for the product quality level. 
That is, the suppliers do not share the impact with the firm if the risk materializes. 
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The firm is internally driven to address this risk. First, it protects reputation as a firm known 
for its ability to produce products of acceptable quality under high cost pressures. Second, the 
firm strives to further develop its reputation in order to increase the market share for its engineer-
to-order equipment products.  
Overall, this is a low impact risk. The firm accepts that some of the components it procures 
can lead to a product failure. It is one of the reasons why after the firm ships products to its cus-
tomers it gives a year of warranty during which customers can communicate regarding any issues 
with the product.  
For each engineer-to-order project the firm selects component suppliers. Its procurement team 
finds suppliers on the open market. On a regular basis, AUTOMATION deals with between 80 
to 120 external component suppliers. Many of these suppliers are local. Due to high cost pres-
sures from their customers, the firm prioritizes cost minimization in procurement and, in particu-
lar, when it selects suppliers. For that reason, the firm sources from suppliers that can provide the 
needed outcomes: low cost components of acceptable quality level. In other words, the firm re-
lies on the outcome-based supplier governance. Its decisions regarding a particular supplier are 
guided by supplier ability to provide needed outcomes.  
To ensure that its suppliers can produce products of acceptable quality the firm engages its 
engineers during supplier selection process. The engineers assess manufacturing capabilities of a 
potential supplier and its ability to comply with the firm’s quality requirements. Once the firm’ 
engineers have evidence that the supplier is able to provide acceptable quality, the firm requests 
a sample order for a destructive testing to further confirm that the supplier has the required quali-
ty system in place.  
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Selected suppliers tend to provide products of acceptable quality but some may not be able to 
do so consistently. As long as supplier meets the outlined performance requirements the firm 
does not intervene to control supplier processes. If a supplier becomes non-compliant, the firm’s 
representatives visit this supplier to assess the non-compliance. Failing to successfully take a cor-
rective action makes it likely that the firm would stop sourcing from such supplier.   
AUTOMATION has a certain tolerance for the supplier risk and hence chooses not to supply 
to customers who are more risk adverse. After the firm selects suppliers that demonstrate an abil-
ity to produce products at the acceptable quality level the firm does not take measures to oversee 
and control their processes. Moreover, the firm is prepared that over time some of its suppliers 
fail to achieve needed outcomes in terms of product quality becoming non-compliant. In fact, 
only when the risk of supplier non-compliance materializes, the firm increases control of its sup-
pliers or finds a new supplier for the component.  
DESK.R 
DESK.R is a contract furniture manufacturer that specializes in customized office furniture. 
Its products include office desks, chairs, filling cabinets, and cubicle walls. The firm works with 
dealers, architects and designers to fulfill orders of such final customers as law firms, large North 
American universities, and Fortune 500 companies.  
The contract furniture market segment faces increasing customer expectations. To keep up 
with them, the firm established an internal continuous improvement program and encourages 
such programs among its suppliers. Its ability to meet customer requirements while remaining 
efficient internally makes the firm one of the few large furniture manufacturers with production 
facilities located in Canada. 
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As a contract manufacturer, DESK.R does not produce products to stock. As a result, the firm 
constantly faces short lead times for its customized products. This constraint pushed the firm to 
become more integrated and to source predominantly locally. Because of short lead times, the 
firm’s main supplier risk is a supplier non-compliance that can delay orders and negatively affect 
their reputation among their customers. To address this risk, the firm needs to ensure that its sup-
pliers have sufficient capabilities to produce the needed amount of product within a short time 
window following the firm’s requirements for product and processes. This is a low impact sup-
plier risk: a supplier non-compliance will delay the firm’s fulfillment of a particular customer 
order but is unlikely to inflict a long-term damage on the firm’s supply chain processes or se-
verely affect its reputation.  
The firm works with approximately 300 suppliers, of which 80 are its main suppliers. Most of 
its suppliers produce commodity products and raw materials including wood, metals, glass, and 
textiles. A number of factors allow the firm to ensure that these suppliers are incentivized to re-
main compliant. First, the firm is one of the few large Canadian furniture manufacturers that ac-
tively seek working with local suppliers. Second, the firm invests significant resources in suppli-
er development, offers long-term relationships to its suppliers, and assists its better suppliers 
with adapting to increasing requirements. Furthermore, a supplier that causes a supply disruption 
will share the negative impact of this risk. Specifically, the firm is able to specify in its terms and 
conditions that suppliers would be held responsible for non-compliances charging them “massive 
penalties”.  
The firm’s management believes that when they procure from these suppliers the likelihood of 
supplier non-compliance is low. These suppliers have sufficient capabilities as well as incentives 
to fulfill orders following the firm’s requirements. With these suppliers, the firm relies on rela-
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tional governance. It fosters close relational ties with its suppliers by helping them improve their 
operations and educating them about new products and emerging trends in the industry. Further-
more, DESK.R does not put substantial cost pressures and if it finds a way to internally save on 
certain aspects of a product it shares savings with the relevant suppliers. In general, the firm’s 
management believes it is essential to have long-term supplier relationships and let good suppli-
ers develop. As a result, the management believes that the close relational ties make it unneces-
sary to acquire comprehensive information on supplier processes. 
DESK.R believes that its suppliers are reliable. As a result, the firm relies on relational gov-
ernance to avoid the risk of supplier non-compliance. The firm is convinced that these suppliers 
have both capabilities and sufficient incentives to meet the firm’s expectations and requirements 
and therefore it does not need to mitigate this risk.  
DESK.UN 
This case focuses on the same firm as in DESK.R but considers how this firm sources from a 
supply base consisting of unreliable suppliers. This supply base is considerably smaller than the 
firm’s supply base of reliable suppliers. The firm sources from unreliable suppliers because it is 
forced to procure the majority of its raw materials locally. Some of its local suppliers lack pro-
duction capabilities and, as a result, over time are likely to cause a non-compliance.  
These local suppliers of raw materials tend to be small firms. These suppliers adhere to the 
firm’s terms and conditions and can face significant penalties for non-compliances that end up 
disrupting the firm’s processes. Therefore, if they become non-compliant they will share the im-
pact of this materialized risk. At the same time, they tend to lack production capabilities, often 
struggle to adapt to emerging industry requirements and do not have sufficient knowledge of new 
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trends in the industry. These factors necessitate the firm to have a greater level of oversight of 
processes of these suppliers. 
Specifically, with these suppliers, DESK.UN engages in behavior-based contractual govern-
ance. First, the firm makes sure that the suppliers agree to adhere to its terms and conditions. 
However, because of lacking capabilities suppliers may fail to comply with the firm’s order re-
quirements. For that reason, the firm assigns employees to remain in facilities of these suppliers 
and ensure that the suppliers engage in processes that comply with the firm’s requirements. In 
other words, having the firm’s representatives that acquiring information on supplier processes 
enables this governance mechanism. 
With these suppliers, the firm has gained an ability to mitigate the supplier risk before it mate-
rializes. Specifically, the firm assigns its employees to remain in supplier facilities to assure 
compliance. If these suppliers sufficiently improve their processes, the firm starts to rely more 
heavily on relational governance mechanism and stops directly acquiring comprehensive infor-
mation on supplier processes. 
HARDWOOD.R 
This case focuses on a hardwood producer that sources lumber from a number of saw mills, 
with which it has established trust-based relationships. HARDWOOD.R is a small firm that spe-
cializes in North American lumber, mostly maple, ash, and oak. The firm seeks to procure timber 
of high quality. Also, it carries diverse inventory that its competitors choose not to stock. One of 
the main reasons for prioritizing high quality and diverse inventory is its weak market position. 
Some of its current customers seek to procure directly from its suppliers and some of its largest 
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suppliers are its main competitors. It deals mainly with overseas customers from China, UK, Ja-
pan, and Germany. 
The firm’s suppliers are sawmills located in Ohio, Pennsylvania, Ontario, and Quebec. The 
North American hardwood industry has undergone significant consolidation and many saw mills 
merged or went out of business. On a regular basis, the firm sources from 30 to 50 saw mills. 
The firm faces supplier non-compliances both in terms of wood quality or delivery time. This 
supplier risk has low potential impact. If materialized, this risk will cause short-term financial 
losses but will be unlikely to have lasting negative effects on the firm. To ensure that a supplier 
remain compliant the firm needs to assure that the suppliers are capable of fulfilling their orders 
following the agreed requirements for timber quality and delivery times.  
A number of internal drivers incentivize the firm to address this supplier risk. First, it has lim-
ited human resources for managing suppliers. Second, both receiving timber of poor quality and 
managing delayed deliveries are disruptive to its daily operations. Second, because of long pro-
duction process of hardwoods and significant credit risk the firm needs to ensure dependable 
supply of wood.  
HARDWOOD.R prefers working with suppliers it believes to be reliable. The firm’s man-
agement believes that these suppliers are associated with low likelihood of non-compliance. 
Over time these suppliers have demonstrated their ability to provide a reliable supply of high 
quality timber. The firm relies on relational governance to manage these suppliers. Because of 
the firm trusts the suppliers, it does not directly oversee how the suppliers prepare the ordered 
wood. Instead, the firm’s management fosters close relational ties with owners and member of 
sales force of these suppliers via regular calls, meetings, and visits. Some of these suppliers are 
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dependent on the firm’s expertise in wood grading. That is, these suppliers let the firm grade the 
wood, which then determines how much the firm pays the suppliers for the shipment. Long-term 
relationships, trust, and mutual dependence incentivize these suppliers to be responsive to the 
firm’s requirements. If one of these suppliers fails to comply, it will severe its relationship with 
the firm. Therefore, the supplier will be negatively affected if the risk is materialized. 
With its focus on relational governance, HARDWOOD.R is able to avoid the supplier risk 
when it sources from suppliers it views as reliable. The firm expects that these suppliers remain 
responsive to its requirements for wood quality and delivery times. It chooses not to oversee how 
the suppliers fulfill its orders and instead believes that relational ties allow avoiding the risk.  
HARDWOOD.UN 
This case considers the same firm as in HARDWOOD.R but sourcing timber from a different 
supply base. This supply base consists of suppliers that the firm views as being unreliable. The 
firm’s supply chain has been consolidated, and as a result, the firm cannot be selective about 
suppliers it relies upon. For that reason, the firm is willing to procure from unreliable suppliers.  
These unreliable suppliers tend to be large sawmills located in the United States. Many of 
them are the firm’s direct competitors. Moreover, these suppliers are known for supplying wood 
of inferior quality or delaying shipments. For instance, one of these suppliers is known for sell-
ing wood it has not got in stock (i.e., has not received wood from loggers). Another supplier had 
tried to bypass the firm and sell its timber directly to one of the firm’s customers. Overall, these 
suppliers do not depend on the firm and if they fail to comply they will not be affected by their 
non-compliance. 
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Because these suppliers are not motivated to comply with the firm’s requirements, the firm 
takes measures to control their processes, engaging in behavior-based contractual governance. 
The firm ensures that these suppliers comply with its order requirements by having an employee 
located close to suppliers’ facilities who controls how suppliers fulfill the firm’s orders. The em-
ployee travels to suppliers’ facilities and oversees how supplier prepares wood for the shipment. 
He has more than 25 years of experience in the industry and is employed by the firm specifically 
to conduct such informal monitoring of supplier processes. 
With its unreliable suppliers, HARDWOOD.UN cannot avoid the supplier risk to the required 
extent and faces high likelihood of supplier non-compliance. For that reason, with these suppliers 
the firm focuses on mitigating the likelihood of supplier non-compliance by relying on behavior-
based contractual governance. It employs an agent who oversees supplier processes and ensures 
that suppliers do not trigger a non-compliance.  
MILK 
MILK is a large Canadian dairy firm that produces a variety of dairy products and then sells 
them via different channels: under its own brands in retail stores, as co-pack products, as private 
label products produced for large retail chains, and as ingredient products produced for manufac-
turers of other food products. The firm’s top priority is high product quality. It established a ro-
bust quality assurance system. The firm continuously improves the system and invests resources 
into developing product packaging and new testing methods. In fact, the firm is able to attract 
many of its customers because of its reputation of quality-focused firm.  
The product quality depends on sourcing from farms that eliminate any potential triggers of 
milk contamination. The risk of its suppliers producing contaminating milk is the main supplier 
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risk MILK faces. If materialized, this supplier risk will have high impact on the firm: it would 
disrupt its supply chain processes but more importantly would have long-term negative effect on 
its reputation. 
The firm faces significant external drivers to ensure high quality of the procured milk. Its 
large customers put significant pressures on the firm to control the risk of product contamination 
and impose strict policies for quality assurance measures. If the firm uses contaminated milk in 
its products, it is likely to severe the firm’s relationships with these key customers. 
Fresh milk is 80% of the firm’s purchasing cost, with the rest spent mostly on packaging ma-
terials. The firm procures fresh milk from Ontario milk farmers but it does so via Dairy Farmers 
of Ontario (DFO), a governmental agency that controls milk supply in the province. The DFO 
acts as an intermediary supplier between milk farms and milk processing plants: the firm sends 
order to the DFO, which procures milk from 3,000 Ontario milk farms and then ships it to the 
firm. The firm is not allowed to procure milk from any other sources. At the same time, Ontario 
farms are constrained by regulation to having the DFO as their only customer. In particular, the 
farms cannot bypass DFO and sell milk abroad or even directly to the firm.   
Overall, the farms are incentivized to avoid milk contamination. If an Ontario farm sells con-
taminated milk, it would be negatively affected by this materialized risk: the DFO would hold 
the farm financially responsible and even may revoke its license. Without an ability to sell milk 
to the DFO the farm is likely to go out of business. In MILK’s experience farms almost never 
supply contaminated milk, as they are aware of the requirements and potential consequences for 
non-compliance. 
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In general, hazards that have potential to trigger milk contamination are present in daily oper-
ations of milk farms. However, the aim of the DFO quality program that the farmers adhere to is 
to eliminate potential food safety hazards. Due to the DFO’s role in the supply chain, the likeli-
hood of farm producing contaminated milk is low. 
The involvement of the DFO allows MILK to rely on behavior-based contractual governance. 
The firm outsources to the DFO the efforts to assure that suppliers have the required processes in 
place. This stakeholder oversees on an ongoing basis whether practices of licensed farms comply 
with the established requirements. These requirements are based on Hazard Analysis Critical 
Control Point (HACCP) and cover all aspects of milk production form feeding to milking to 
shipping cattle. Moreover, the program establishes a plan for corrective actions, prescribes farm-
ers to actively involve veterinarians, and requires keeping detailed records about any material-
ized non-compliances (drug treatment, broken needles, etc.) and taken corrective actions. Finally, 
the DFO conducts its own testing of milk and ensures traceability of milk to a particular farm. In 
other words, it is the DFO that ensures that suppliers have needed process in place.  
Because of the DFO’s involvement, the firm does not participate in supplier selection and 
does not allocate resources towards acquiring information on supplier processes. Moreover, it 
does not have information about particular Ontario farms its milk comes from. Instead, the firm’s 
management is only aware of the requirements DFO places on the farmers.  
The risk of a supplier producing contaminated milk has high impact and – due to DFO’s pres-
ence in the industry - low likelihood. The firm addresses this risk by avoiding it. MILK is able to 
avoid this risk because of the DFO involvement in its milk supply chain. In fact, the firm is fully 
dependent on the DFO’s ability to ensure compliance of the milk farms. It does not oversee pro-
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duction of these farms nor does it know which farms each milk truck comes from. Therefore, the 
DFO practices determine the extent to which the firm is able to avoid non-compliances in its 
supply chain. 
PIPING-PARTS.R 
PIPING-PARTS.R is a small pipeline component manufacturer that sources semi-finished 
components from four North American suppliers. The firm sells its components (various types of 
flanges and fittings) to piping companies in the oil and gas industry. It carries a diverse inventory 
of semi-finished components, which it customizes according to customers’ order specifications.  
The piping industry is sensitive to product defects. For that reason, to attract customers the 
firm emphasizes its high product quality. Its customers do not monitor production of the firm or 
of its suppliers and expect that the firm will operate according to its reputation and will assure 
high quality of its products. 
High product quality requires procuring defect-free semi-finished piping components from 
suppliers. Therefore, its main supplier risk is a supplier producing a defective component. Most 
likely, a component can become defective when a supplier heat-treats it in a furnace. Once the 
component is heat treated, defects are hard to identify.  
This supplier risk has high potential impact. If installed in a pipe by one of the firm’s final 
customers, the defective component may later crack under pressure and cause an operational dis-
aster such as an oil spill. If this risk materializes it can lead to significant financial losses and can 
have a lasting negative effect on the firm’s reputation. As a result, the firm is internally driven to 
address this risk. The firm’s presence on the market depends on its reputation of a firm that prior-
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itizes quality. In particular, it positions itself as an intermediary firm that guarantees control of its 
suppliers making it unnecessary for its customers to monitor its suppliers. 
From its four North American suppliers, PIPING-PARTS.R sources non-standard products 
(e.g., based on an unusual alloy) in small volumes or when a customer requests a rush order. The 
firm believes that when it procures from its North American suppliers the likelihood of procuring 
a non-compliant component is low. The reason is that these suppliers follow a business model 
similar to the firm’s: they attract customers because they are known for their emphasis on prod-
uct quality. If one of these suppliers manufactures a defective product that later leads to an op-
erational catastrophe, the materialized risk will severely affect both the reputation of the firm and 
of the suppler responsible for the defect. In other words, the North American suppliers will share 
the impact if the risk materializes. 
Aligned vision on the importance of product quality makes it possible for the firm to rely on 
relational governance. These suppliers have demonstrated their adherence to complying with the 
firm’s order requirements. They communicate about their products and disclose how they ap-
proach the critical stages of production. The firm management believes that it does not need to 
oversee processes of these suppliers because of their organization culture that emphasizes high 
product quality. Overall, the firm trusts that these suppliers would perform according to the 
firm’s expectations and requirements.  
With these suppliers, PIPING-PARTS.R focuses on risk avoidance. It believes that the viabil-
ity of these suppliers depends on maintaining their reputation and therefore these suppliers are 
unlikely to produce defective components. The firm has visited facilities of these suppliers and 
evaluated their responsiveness to its requirements and chose not to acquire comprehensive in-
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formation on their production processes. Instead, it trusts that over time the suppliers will remain 
compliant.  
PIPING-PARTS.UN 
This case considers the same firm as in PIPING-PARTS.R sourcing the same type of products 
(semi-finished components) but from a different supply base. This supply base consists of 18 
offshore suppliers. From them the firm procures components of standard design in high volumes. 
These suppliers are associated with the same supplier risk of high potential impact: a supplier 
producing a defective component. Unlike its North American supply base, these suppliers are 
associated with the supplier risk of high likelihood. The firm believes that its offshore suppliers 
lack capabilities to assure that no defects are introduced to the components. In addition, these 
suppliers do not strive to protect their reputation to the extent the PIPING-PARTS.UN does. 
They are known for their cost-cutting organizational culture and for prioritizing profits over 
product quality. Moreover, the suppliers operate in an institutional environment, where corrup-
tion is common. As a result, they do not share the negative impact of the risk and lack incentives 
to ensure that products they manufacture for the firm are defect-free.  
PIPING-PARTS.UN does not trust that the offshore suppliers can produce high quality prod-
ucts on consistent basis. For that reason, the firm relies on behavior-based contractual govern-
ance. The firm agrees to source from these suppliers only if they follow detailed requirements for 
critical-to-quality production processes. At the same time, the firm believes that even if the sup-
pliers are aware of the requirements they might not comply with them. For that reason, to ensure 
compliance the firm has an off-site team that monitors the processes and remains in the suppli-
ers’ facilities until the produced products are shipped out to the firm. 
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The firm’s off-site team consists of engineers. Their function is to remain in suppliers’ facili-
ties and control each stage of the production process including the selection of raw materials the 
suppliers use to manufacture the firm’s components. Most importantly, the off-site team moni-
tors heat treatment of the components. It is a critical production stage, during which a product 
can become fragile and later crack under pressure. The firm’s management believes that the off-
site team should control production even of its long-term offshore suppliers. To make it possible 
for the off-site team to oversee production of all its offshore suppliers the firm has chosen sup-
pliers located in close proximity to each other.  
With its offshore suppliers, the firm engages in behavior-based contractual governance. Its 
management believes that these suppliers cannot sufficiently avoid the risk of manufacturing de-
fective components. For that reason, the firm oversees each step of production and hence is able 
to mitigate potential supplier non-compliances.  
PROSCUITTO 
PROSCUITTO is a small meat processing plant that produces cured, cooked, and frozen Ital-
ian meat products. The firm is a plant with a federal license, the highest standard in the meat pro-
cessing industry. Being a federal plant gives the firm a right to sell across Canada and to export. 
Its products are sold mostly in independent grocery stores but also in a few large grocery retail 
chains. At the same time, the federal license puts it under the highest level of regulatory control 
and requires sourcing meat only from federal slaughterhouses.  
The only meat ingredient the firm uses in its products is pork. It is the firm’s main expense in 
procurement and its critical-to-quality purchase. The firm mainly procures meat from a single 
federal slaughterhouse. The main risk PROSCUITTO faces is sourcing from a supplier that pro-
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duces contaminated meat. This is a high-impact supplier risk, and the firm is under significant 
external pressure to address it. The federal regulation keeps the firm responsible for any product 
contamination even if the contamination is originated in the meat supplier’s facility. In addition, 
if the firm uses contaminated meat in its products and then ships it to one of its customers, it 
would need to issue a recall, and recalls are associated with significant financial and reputational 
losses. 
At the same time, the firm believes that the likelihood of the supplier producing a contaminat-
ed product is low. In general, food safety hazards are present in daily operations of slaughter-
houses. However, to ensure that federal slaughterhouses eliminate the hazards, their processes 
are controlled and regulated by a powerful external stakeholder, Canadian Food Inspection 
Agency (CFIA). CFIA inspectors are on staff of federal slaughterhouses; they ensure that pro-
duction processes comply with the regulatory requirements and with the Hazard Analysis Critical 
Control Point (HACCP) program. The HACCP program is used throughout the Canadian meat 
processing industry to ensure that firms in the industry control potential food safety hazards. 
Overall, the CFIA’s direct control of the supplier’s operations makes the risk of a supplier pro-
ducing a contaminated product a low-likelihood supplier risk. 
The firm’s meat supplier will share the impact if this risk materializes. If it produces contami-
nated meat and ships it to the firm, the slaughterhouse would share legal responsibility in the 
case of a product recall. Moreover, if the supplier contaminates its product it faces a threat of 
CFIA suspending or even revoking its federal license. Therefore, the slaughterhouse has incen-
tives to comply with the CFIA’s requirements minimizing the likelihood of product contamina-
tion.  
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CFIA’s involvement influences how the firm governs its meat supplier. The firm relies on be-
havior-based contractual governance, with the key aspects of this governance mechanism ena-
bled by the CFIA. The agency assigns inspectors to oversee all aspects of the slaughterhouse’s 
production from purchasing to slaughtering to shipping. The inspectors have a right to detain 
non-compliant product, stop production, order the slaughterhouse to recall its products, and even 
initiate the process of revoking its license.  
For that reason, the firm believes that the processes of the slaughterhouse do not contain po-
tential triggers of product contamination and follow the requirements of the CFIA. As a result, 
the firm does not allocate resources towards acquiring comprehensive information on supplier 
processes and outsource these efforts to the CFIA. In fact, its management believes that it would 
not gain any important information by directly overseeing the processes of the supplier.  
Overall, PROSCUITTO does not strive to have comprehensive information on its supplier’s 
processes. It relies on behavior-based relational governance with the supplier processes con-
trolled by the involved stakeholder and not the firm. The firm avoids the supplier risk of procur-
ing contaminated meat to the extent largely determined by the effectiveness of the CFIA in-
volvement in controlling and regulating the supplier.  
  
 160 
APPENDIX D. SIMULATION CODE 
globals [N_r] 
breed [firms firm]                            
breed [risks risk]                              
directed-link-breed [chains chain]               
firms-own [level capability impact risk_caused P_R fired] 
risks-own [level origin location previous-location time_created]  
 
to setup 
ca  
ask patches [set pcolor white] 
set N_r 0 
random-seed 100 
create-random-tree (Supply_Base_Size + 1) Supply_Base_Size   
reset-ticks   ;;Reset time 
end 
 
to create-random-tree [number-of-nodes #-direct] 
set-default-shape firms "circle" 
create-firms 1 [          
set level 0                                     
set capability Firm_capability                       
set impact Firm_risk_impact                 
set risk_caused 0                   
set size 2.5 
set color grey ] 
 
create-firms (#-direct) [                                      
set level 1                                         
set size 2 
set risk_caused 0 
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set color grey] 
 
ask firms with [level = 1] [ create-chain-to one-of firms with [level = 0] ]            
layout-radial turtles chains one-of turtles with [level = 0]                                
 
ask firms with [level > 0] [ set capability random-float 1 set impact random-float 1 ]      
 
ask firms  [ set capability precision capability 2 set impact precision impact  
set color impact * 9 set size capability * 3 ] 
end 
 
to supplier_selection 
ask firms with [level = 1] [ 
if (Approach = "Mitigation") or (Approach = "Tolerance") [ 
ifelse ( [capability] of one-of out-chain-neighbors )*(  [impact] of one-of out-chain-neighbors ) > 
random-float 1 
[set capability  Selection_Threshold + random-float (1 - Selection_Threshold) ] 
[set capability random-float Selection_Threshold ]] 
 
if Approach = "Relationships-enabled-Avoidance"  [ 
ifelse ( [capability] of one-of out-chain-neighbors )*(  [impact] of one-of out-chain-neighbors ) > 
random-float 1 
[set capability  Selection_Threshold + random-float (1 - Selection_Threshold) ] 
[set capability random-float Selection_Threshold ] 
ifelse ( [impact] of one-of out-chain-neighbors ) > random-float 1 
[set impact  [impact] of one-of out-chain-neighbors + random-float (1 - [impact] of one-of out-
chain-neighbors) ] 
[set impact random-float [impact] of one-of out-chain-neighbors ] ] 
 
if Approach = "Stakeholder-enabled-Avoidance" [ 
ifelse ( [capability] of one-of out-chain-neighbors )*( Stakeholder_Impact ) > random-float 1 
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[set capability  Selection_Threshold + random-float (1 - Selection_Threshold) ] 
[set capability random-float Selection_Threshold ] 
ifelse ( Stakeholder_Impact ) > random-float 1 
[set impact  Stakeholder_Impact + random-float (1 - Stakeholder_Impact) ] 
[set impact random-float Stakeholder_Impact]]] 
 
ask firms  [   set capability precision capability 2 set impact precision impact 2 
set color impact * 9 set size capability * 3 ] 
end 
 
to go 
let count_suppliers 1 
let P_nc 0 
while [count_suppliers <= count firms with [level = 1] ] [ 
ask firm count_suppliers [ 
 
if Approach = "Mitigation"                        
[ set P_nc alpha * (1 - capability * impact ) * (1 - [capability] of one-of out-chain-neighbors * 
[impact] of one-of out-chain-neighbors )  
set P_R P_nc ] 
 
if Approach = "Stakeholder-enabled-Avoidance"     
[ set P_nc alpha * (1 - capability * impact ) * (1 - Stakeholder_Capability ) 
set P_R P_nc ] 
 
if Approach = "Relationships-enabled-Avoidance"   
[ set P_nc alpha * (1 - capability * impact )                                                                      
set P_R P_nc ] 
 
if Approach = "Tolerance"  
[ set P_nc alpha * (1 - capability * impact )                                                     
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set P_R P_nc ]] 
 
if P_nc  > random-float 1 
[   create-risks 1  [ 
set time_created ticks 
set location firm count_suppliers 
set origin [who] of location 
move-to location ] 
set N_r N_r + 1  ] 
set count_suppliers count_suppliers + 1 
set P_nc 0] 
 
ask firms with [any? risks-here] [ set risk_caused risk_caused + 1] 
ask risks [ 
let new-location one-of [out-link-neighbors] of location 
move-to new-location 
set previous-location location 
set location new-location] 
 
ask firms [ if capability < 0.01 [ set capability 0.01 ] if capability > 0.99 [ set capability 0.99 ] ]   
ask firms [ if impact < 0.01   [ set  impact 0.01 ]  if impact > 0.99   [ set impact 0.99 ] ]  
 
ask firms [ 
if capability < 1 and capability > 0  
[ if fluctuations > random-float 1 [ let c one-of [0.01 -0.01] set capability capability + c ]] 
if impact < 1 and impact > 0 and level > 0  
[ if fluctuations > random-float 1 [ let c one-of [0.01 -0.01] set impact impact + c ]]] 
 
ask firms  [   set capability precision capability 2 set impact precision impact 2 
set color impact * 9 set size capability * 3 
set label-color red set label precision P_R 3] 
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if Reaction = "terminate_relationships" [ 
ask firm 0  [ 
if any? in-chain-neighbors with [risk_caused > 0 ] [ 
ask in-chain-neighbors with [risk_caused > 0 ] [                               
set fired true]]] 
 
ask firms with [fired = true] [ 
if (Approach = "Mitigation") or (Approach = "Tolerance") [ 
ifelse (  [capability] of one-of out-chain-neighbors ) * (  [impact] of one-of out-chain-neighbors ) 
> random-float 1 
[set capability  Selection_Threshold + random-float (1 - Selection_Threshold) ] 
[set capability random-float Selection_Threshold ] 
set impact   random-float 1 ] 
 
if Approach = "Relationships-enabled-Avoidance" and level = 1 [ 
ifelse (  [capability] of one-of out-chain-neighbors ) * (  [impact] of one-of out-chain-neighbors ) 
> random-float 1 
[set capability  Selection_Threshold + random-float (1 - Selection_Threshold) ] 
[set capability random-float Selection_Threshold ] 
ifelse (  [impact] of one-of out-chain-neighbors ) > random-float 1 
[set impact  [impact] of one-of out-chain-neighbors + random-float (1 - [impact] of one-of out-
chain-neighbors) ] 
[set impact random-float [impact] of one-of out-chain-neighbors ] ] 
 
if Approach = "Stakeholder-enabled-Avoidance" [ 
ifelse (  [capability] of one-of out-chain-neighbors )*( Stakeholder_Impact ) > random-float 1 
[set capability  Selection_Threshold + random-float (1 - Selection_Threshold) ] 
[set capability random-float Selection_Threshold ] 
ifelse (  Stakeholder_Impact ) > random-float 1 
[set impact  Stakeholder_Impact + random-float (1 - Stakeholder_Impact) ] 
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[set impact random-float Stakeholder_Impact]]] 
ask firms with [fired = true] 
[ set fired false set risk_caused 0 set capability precision capability 2 set impact precision impact 
2 set size capability * 3 set color impact * 9 set label-color red set label precision P_R 3]] 
 
if Reaction = "continue_relationships" [ 
ask firm 0  [ 
if any? risks-here [ ask risks-here [ 
ask previous-location [ 
if capability < Selection_Threshold     [  if (  ( capability / Selection_Threshold ) * impact  ) > 
random-float 1 
[ set capability  Selection_Threshold ]]]]]] 
 
ask firms  [ set capability precision capability 2 set size capability * 3 set label-color red set label 
precision P_R 3]] 
ask risks [ if [level] of location = 0 [die ]] ;; removing materialized risks from the system 
tick 
end 
 
